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ABSTRACT 
Operators of large-scale industrial process plants such as nuclear power stations and 
chemical production plants are faced wi th a critical and complex task when 
confronted with disturbances in normal operation caused by technical failures or 
maintenance errors. Great care must be taken to prepare and support the operators 
during such situations. Procedural systems are provided, training on full-scale high-
fidelity simulators is often a prerequisite and decision-support systems are starting to 
be incorporated, especially in modern control rooms. 
During recent years, it has become increasingly clear from "real-life" studies in 
complex production and transport industries that professional highly skilled trouble-
shooters can develop effective general purpose search strategies for locating and 
dealing with faults and, most importantly, wi th new and not previously experienced 
faults. This research has indicated that means for training of these general diagnostic 
abilities can be developed. In addition, other work has dealt w i th the problem of 
observing and analyzing operator behaviour in coping wi th disturbances The 
NKA/LIT-4 project has continued these efforts in studying methods for training 
diagnostic skills as well as for observing and testing operator behaviour on training 
simulators. 
IMS Descriptors: COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION; CONTROL ROOMS, NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANTS; HUMAN FACTORS; TRAINING. NORDIC COUNTRIES 
This report forms part of the safety programme sponsored by NKA, the Nordic Liaison 
Committee for Atomic Energy, 1981-8. The work has been partly financed by the 
Nordic Council of Ministers. 
PREFACE 
The safety of nuclear power, as for other complicated industrial 
processes, depends on an accurate and timely execution of tasks 
during the operation. There is. however, always the possibility 
that human errors either directly or indirectly initiate an 
unwanted course of events. The general aim is then to decrease the 
probability of human errors and to increase the probability of 
their detection. This is in principle made possible by a careful 
task design and by giving the human operator an appropriate 
training. This means in practice thai one should consider the 
tools of the operator, the organization he is working in, and the 
training he is given. All these aspects have been addressed in the 
Nordic LIT-research programme over the period 1981 to 1985. 
The Nordic LIT-research programme has concentrated on. 
human errors in test and maintenance (LIT-1) 
safety oriented organizations and human reliability 
( L I T - 2 ) 
computer aided design of control rooms and plant 
automation (LIT-3.1) 
computer aided operation and experimental validation 
(LIT-3.2 and LIT-3.3) 
planning and evaluation of operator training (LIT-4). 
These fields of research were selected from the experience of an 
earlier phase of the Nordic cooperation (cf. the reference 
Wahistrdm, Rasmussen, 1983). 
The Nordic LIT-research programme involved a total effort of about 
40 personyears of qualified researchers in Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden. The research programme has been financed partly 
by project funds from the Nordic Council of Ministers and partly 
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by funds from the different participating organizations. The LIT-
research programme was initiated by the Nordic Liaison Committee 
for Atomic Energy (NKA) as a part of the Nordic cooperation in the 
field of safety in the energy production field. The following 
organizations have been financing and have also been directly 
involved in the LIT-research programme: 
Risø National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark 
Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT), Espoo, Finland 
Institute for Energy Technology (IFE), Halden, Norway 
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), Stockholm, Sweden 
Swedish State Power Board, Vållingby, Sweden 
The LIT programme is reported in the fol lowing final reports: 
The Human Component in the Safety of Complex Systems, 
LIT programme summary report, NKA/LIT(85)1 
Human Errors in Test and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants -
Nordic Project Work; LIT-1 final report, NKA/LIT(85)2 
Organizations for Safety; LIT-2 final report, NKA/LIT(85)3 
The Design Process and the Use of Computerized Tools in 
Control Room Design; LIT-3.1 final report, NKA/LIT(85)4 
Computer Aided Operation of Complex Systems; LIT 3.2 & 3.3 
final report, NKA/LIT(85)5 
Training in Diagnostic Skills for Nuclear Power Plants; LIT-4 
final report, NKA/LIT(85)6 
i i i 
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SUMMARY 
Control room operators of large-scale industrial plants, such as nuclear power plants 
and chemical production plants, are often faced with a critical and complex task when 
disturbances occur because of component failures, maintenance problems, etc. Great 
care has to be taken to support the staff on such occasions; e.g., emergency procedures 
are prepared, training takes place on large-scale high-fidelity simulators, appropriate 
aids are included in the control room, etc. Several of these aspects have been topics for 
the joint research programs sponsored by NKA. 
The project LIT-4, discussed in this report, has been devoted to the study of methods for 
training diagnostic skills and for observing operators' diagnostic performance on 
training simulators. In recent years, it has become increasingly clear from studies in 
Denmark, the U.S.A. and the U.K. of diagnostic strategies used in "real-life" tasks 
within electronic maintenance, petro-chemical industries, aviation, etc. that 
professional, highly skilled trouble-shooters develop "know-how" and utilize search 
strategies which can be very effective but which are not based on formal theoretical 
knowledge of system operation. This research has indicated that effective methods for 
training of general diagnostic abilities can be developed from an identification of 
effective search strategies and an analysis of the knowledge required in the form of 
procedural rules and plant characteristics. Other studies have indicated that suitable 
observation and analytic tools can be useful for following and studying actual operator 
behaviour in diagnosing and further coping with transients during simulator training 
The research results already available in the institutes participating in the joint 
Scandinavian program in terms of models of human information processing, human 
reliability, operator performance during emergencies, etc. appeared to give a promising 
basis for establishing projects to study the transfer of such results to Nordic training 
simulator centers. 
The main results can be summarized as follows: 
* a more concentrated and integrated training in diagnosis would significantly 
improve the crews' ability to treat disturbed plant states. 
* operators should be given support in obtaining a clear "view of the whole" so as to 
enable them to select and use the appropriate procedures. 
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* communication and cooperation among crew members can be a problem, 
especially in complex and critical situations. The ability to verbally mediate one's 
reasoning and actions should be promoted. 
* operators who were given a diagnostic rule course were very satisfled with the 
structured method it gave for tackling disturbances for which few or no 
instructions were applicable. 
* the instructors felt that diagnostic training should be an integral part of the 
operators' basic training. An important followup to the LIT4 project should be the 
development of suitable diagnostic training material and methods - for both 
theoretical and practical training. 
* some of the results are being employed in the design of a training program for the 
OECD Halden NORS simulator. 
As a general comment, the projects indicated the feasibility of a useful cooperation 
between nuclear power plant operations, training specialists and researchers. 
SAMMENFATNING 
Operatørerne i kontrolrum på store industrielle anlæg - f.eks., 
kernekraftværker eller kemiske fabrikker - står tit over for en 
kritisk og kompleks opgave, når driftsforstyrrelser opstår på 
grund af fejl i komponenter eller vedligeholdelsen. Derfor er det 
påkrævet at støtte driftsstaben i sådanne situationer ved at 
udvikle nødprocedurer, udstyre kontrolrummet med avancerede 
støtteforanstaltninger, indføre et passende træningsprogam med 
brug af en stor, realistisk simulator, m.m. Flere af disse punkter 
har været emner for tidligere forskningsprogrammer i NKA-regi. 
,IT-4 projektet, som beskrives i denne rapport, omhandler metoder 
til træning af diagnostiske færdigheder såvel som iagttagelse af 
operatørens diagnostiske optræden ved en træningssimulator. I de 
senere år har man i Danmark og fiere andre lande udført studier 
over de diagnostiske strategier som faktisk bliver brugt i 
virkelige situationer, f.eks. ved elektronisk vedligeholdelse, i 
den kemiske industri, fly o.s.v. Her har man fundet ud af, at 
professionelle, højt-kvalificerede fejlfindere udvikler "know-how" 
og anvender søgestrategier, som er meget effektive, men som ikke 
normalt er baseret på teoretisk viden. Denne forskning peger på, 
at det er muligt at udvikle effektive metoder til træning af 
diagnostiske færdigheder. Dette kræver identifikation af hvilke 
søgestrategier, som kan anvendes samt en analyse af den nødvendige 
viden i form af regler og anlægskarakteristika. Andre studier har 
påvist, at der foreligger egnede iagtagelses- og andre analytiske 
værktøjer til at understøtte undersøgelser af operatørens faktiske 
optræden ved træningssimulatoren. 
I projektet har man undersøgt, hvordan disse metoder virker når de 
overføres til nordiske træningscentre. I dette arbejde har man 
kunnet bygge på tidligere NKA-samarbejde vedrørende modeller af 
menneskelig informationsbehandling, menneskelig pålidelighed og 
kontrolrumsdesign. Nogle af projektets resultater er med held 
blevet brugt i gennemførelsen af træningsprogrammet på NORS-
simulatoren ved Halden-projektet. 
Projektets hovedresultater var: 
VIII 
En koncentreret og integreret trrning vedrørende diagnose vil 
medføre en væsentlig forbedring af operatørens muligheder for 
at håndtere unormale situationer på anlægget. 
Man bør sørge for, at operatøren kan få et klart 
helhedsbillede til at støtte sine valg og anvendelse af de 
bedste egnede procedurer. 
Kommunikation og koordination driftsstaben imellem er ofte et 
problem - især i kritiske og komplekse situationer. Man bør 
derfor indføre træning i at kunne formulere sig og mundligt 
forklare/begrunde sine overvejelser og handlinger. 
Operatører, som fik et kursus i diagnostiske regler, var 
tilfredse med den strukturerede måde, de herved fik til at 
håndtere forstyrrelser, for hvilke der ikke forelå 
instruktioner. 
Instruktørerne mente, at diagnostisk træning bør integreres i 
operatørernes grunduddannelse. LIT-4 projektet bør opfyldes af 
udarbejdelsen af et egnet og tilpasset træningsmateriale -
såvel for de teoretiske som de anvendte dele af en træning 
angående diagnose. 
LIT-4 projektet er et eksempel på, hvordan et nyttigt samarbejde 
lader sig gennemføre mellem industriens driftspersonale, 
træningsspecialister og forskere. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The NKA/LIT project on human reliabity included work on computer-
aided design and operations of complex systems. A complementary 
area which became the subject of a separate activity (LIT-4) dealt 
with the planning and evaluation of operator training. The work is 
described in this report. 
The project was an Nordic extension of an earlier international 
effort (International Evaluation of Operational Practises (IEOP)) 
with participation from the USA, France, Germany and Scandinavia. 
This cooperation aimed at establishing and testing methods for 
observing and evaluating operator behavior on training simulators. 
The problem area was relevant in that the various Nordic 
participants had national interests which complemented each other 
rather nicely. Finland and Sweden each has an active nuclear 
program including operator training programs using full-scale 
simulators. Earlier cooperative efforts between VTT and Imatran 
Voima in Finland and with AKU in Sweden had indicated the value of 
gathering and analyzing data on operator performance and human 
errors and drawing conclusions on the implications for training. 
In addition, the OECD Halden Reactor Project in Norway was 
planning the estatlishment of an experimental control room for 
their new full-scale PWR simulator and was interested in designing 
and implementing a training program. At Risø in Denmark, there was 
an interest in the identification of generally useful diagnostic 
rules and strategies which operators could use under disturbed 
conditions in the plant, in particular, with regard to this 
project, the training of such rules was particularly relevant as 
was the verification of their usefulness in practice. 
Thus the main goals of LITf were: 
the development and testing of methods for systematically 
observing, analyzing and interpreting operator performance 
during training. 
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the development and testing of training methods and contents -
for example, the need for specific vs general knowledge. 
Project tasks included: 
developing of a theory and methods for acquisition of data 
from training simulators. 
planning and carrying out of experiments on training 
simulators at AKU (Sweden) and Loviisa (Finland). 
feed back the results in order to evaluate the actual training 
before the experiments, the form of training program and 
methods in a more general way as well as the training 
contents. 
utilize the results in the design of the training program for 
the operators of the new control room of the Halden NORS 
simulator. 
In practice, there were three sub-projects. 
Risø together with the Swedish State Power Board (in particular, 
the Ringhalls nuclear power station) and AKU, the Swedish training 
center, cooperated in an activity on "Methods for training of 
diagnostic skills". 
VTT together with personnel from the Loviisa NPP (operated by 
Imatran Voima) did a study of "Operator errors during simulator 
training". 
A "Study of the generation of diagnostic rules by interviews of 
operators" wa3 performed by the OECD Halden Reactor Project in 
cooperation with Imatran Vcima. 
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These three projects are further described in this report. 
National reports which give more detailed information will be 
available shortly. 
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2. PROBLEM CONTEXT 
The operation of a technical system usually has two main goals: 
Production goals which relate to the result of the system 
operation, often in economic terms. The major concern here is 
to run the technical system in such a way that the optimum 
production results and operating costs are achieved. 
Safety goals which concern the safe operation of the technical 
system from human and environmental points of view. Here the 
onus is here placed on the prevention of damage to technical 
system staff, third parties and environment. 
These two goals are mirrored in the practical man-machine 
interface situations by operating instructions, established 
practices and sometimes even national and international laws and 
regulations. These instructions etc. are imposed on the technical 
system staff in two ways: officially, by stating wt at is required 
during system operation, and unofficially, by influencing 
attitudes towards routine and abnormal system operation. The 
former refers to operation actions laid down by the instructions 
and during training etc. while the latter stems from what is 
desired * hen the instructions are applied to practical situations. 
The desirable way of applying instructions is partly determined by 
formal and informal directives issued by the management of the 
technical system and partly influenced by norms and established 
practice within natural groups of the staff. Thus, existing 
operator goals are results of a combination of formal and informal 
influences originating from both responsible authorities and 
operators' colleagues. From these goals, detailed instructions and 
established practices respectively are derived and implemented in 
the routine operation of the technical system. As this operation 
can include known and foreseeable situations as well as unknown 
and unforeseeable situations, four different types of goal 
descriptions are possible: 
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Forsal 
goals 
Known and fore 
seeable situa-
tions 
Stated in de-
tailed instruc 
tions 
Unknown and unfore-
seeable situations 
Stated in general 
instructions (e.g. 
general priorities 
and procedures} 
Informal 
goals 
Provided by More 
or less detailed 
established prac-
tices etc. 
Have to be deter-
mined by individual 
staff members or 
groups of staff 
members when the 
situations occur 
The significance and "message" of this representation is at least 
three-fold: first, only general instructions covering formal goals 
can be given for unknown and unforeseeable situations. These 
general instructions, for obvious reasons, lack details about the 
nature of situations for which the instructions are applicable. In 
such cases safety goals tend to receive higher priorities than 
production goals due to the unpredictability of situation cause 
and development. 
Therefore, the instructions therefore usually attempt to state how 
to bring the technical system to "safe conditions" in such a way 
that all conceivable threats to the system are overcome. In the 
majority of unknown situations this is equal to a shut-down of the 
system which means that production is interrupted. Thi.«, in turn, 
can impose a goal conflict on the operators of the system: or. the 
one hand the staff is uncertain about the unknown situation and is 
therefore inclined to follow the general instruction which, 
although not directed towards a specific situation cause, is 
supposed to cure all kinds of situations. 
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On the other hand* the staff is loyal to the primary reason for 
their interface with the technical system, i.e. to keep up 
production and put professional pride into its continous and 
trouble-free operation. Secondly, as the operation of technical 
systeas cannot be completely covered by instructions, some 
situations will be dealt with by the operators according to the 
their goal interpretation. Thirdly, in situations in which they 
have to perform a goal interpretation without instructions, the 
outcome of the situation is entirely dependent on the capabilities 
of the operators, both as individuals and as a group. 
The practical aspects of man-machine interface goals can therefore 
be summarised in the following way: 
In th? absolute majority of operation situations, formal goals 
and detailed instructions are available to the operators. 
More or less detailed establisned practices are implemented by 
the operators in two principal types of circumstances: as 
guidance complementary to the formal goals and instructions 
when the latter are incomplete in known and foreseeable 
situations and as major guidance when no goals and 
instructions are available in the same kind of situations. 
In the case of unknown situations, general goals and 
instructions are required for use by the operators. The 
technical system is normally brought to complete or partial 
shut-down conditions due to safety goal related priorities. 
The operators have to determine informal goals and guidance on 
their own in cases of unknown and unforeseeable situations, 
especially if the formal goals and instructions are incomplete 
and/or produce inappropriate results. 
Ambiguity and goal conflict can occur in a small number of 
cases when the operators have to supplement incomplete formal 
goals or determine goals in the absence of formal ones. 
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Experience of, for example, the process industry shows that formal 
goals and instructions supplemented by established practices cover 
close to 100 per cent of normal, slightly disturbed or trivial 
operation situations. In most of the very few cases of seriously 
disturbed or emergency situations the technical system has been 
successfully brought to safe conditions according either to 
general formal directives or to goals and procedures determined by 
the operating staff. In the remaining extremely few cases of 
disturbed or emergency situations, the staff has been unable to 
solve the problem situation and accident has resulted. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING 
With this background in mind, some implications for operator 
training and its evaluation can be derived. 
Operator training strives after the development of the necessary 
resources for coping with situations calling for behavior at the 
skill, rule and knowledge-based levels; that is, supplying the 
operator with an approriate repertoire of behaviors for both 
routine/familiar as well as unexpected situations. Distinctions 
between the named categories of behavior give rise to three phases 
in attaining skilled performance - the early or cognitive phase, 
the intermediate or associative phase and the final or autonomous 
phase (which correspond closely to the knowledge, rule and skill 
categories). The problem in the control room is that there 
probably will be variable resources available to cope with the 
wide repertoire of situations as the result of the different 
amounts of training in the various phases which can be achieved. 
An important consideration also is that training doe: not cease 
after the formal training courses - but continues in a very 
effective manner in the "on-the-job" mode. This can create 
problems in that important but rarely used rules, associations, 
data patterns can be forgotten and/or confused with corresponding 
sets which can be generated "on-line" to cope with the more 
familiar situations. 
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Operators have little chance for developing effective empirical 
rules for infrequent occurrences and, as stated above, specific 
work instructions can not be preplanned for all possible 
situations. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated (from the Three-
Mile Island accident) that instructional systems for major design-
base accidents will not necessarily cover less critical 
situations. Consequently, much importance must be placed on the 
operator being able to function i i the knowledge-based domain and 
generate the necessary rules ad-hoc in the actual situation. Thus 
two of the LIT-M sub-projects investigated various forms for 
training support for general-purpose diagnosis. 
Another implication is the need for generating a feedback to 
training planners and others concerning the effectiveness of the 
implemented training. Thus, continuing the efforts of the IEOP 
program mentioned earlier, the project included two observation 
and analysis activities - one at the AKU simulator and the other 
at the Loviisa simulator. One of these attempted to ascertain the 
effects of training diagnostic rules and the other was concerned 
with identifying and classifying the types of operator errors 
which occurred. 
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3. PROJECT ACTIVITIES 
The three LIT-4 projects are described in the following sections. 
The projects were: 
PROJECT 1 - Methods for training diagnostic skills - carried 
out by the Risø National Laboratory, the Swedish 
State Power Board (Ringhalls power station) and 
AKU, the Swedish nuclear training center. 
PROJECT 2 - Study of operator errors during simulator training 
-project done by the Technical Research Centre of 
Finland (VTT) and Imatran Voims (Loviisa power 
station). 
PROJECT 3 - Study of diagnostic rules by interviews of 
operators - cooperation between the OECD Halden 
Reactor Project and Imatran Voima. 
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3.1 METHODS FOR TRAINING DIAGNOSTIC SKILLS 
Generalized Strategies for State Identification and Diagnosis 
Diagnosis can be considered as an information processing activity 
which can become quit«, complex when diagnosing disturbances in 
technical systems. Thus it i3 convenient to describe the related 
human data processing in terms of data, the mental representations 
of the information describing system state, models representing 
the system's structure and/or function and strategies which relate 
overall goals to sets of models, data and tactical process rules. 
The objective of a diagnostic search may vary; to protect the 
plant, to compensate for the effects of a fault, to restore normal 
state, etc. To be able to support and train operators in this 
task, it is necessary to study the diagnostic strategies which are 
actually used in different situations. From this, one can 
generalize and formulate a set of strategies which can be used as 
the basis for system design, training, etc. In addition, it is 
important to discover the subjective preferences and performance 
criteria which guide the choice of and shifts between the 
strategies to be used in a specific situation. 
In general, the diagnostic task in the present context is a search 
tr identify and deal with a change from normal or planned 
operation in terms which can refer the controller to appropriate 
control actions. 
A set of observations representing the abnormal state of the 
system - a set of symptoms - can be used as a search template in 
accessing a l'brary of symptoms related to different abnormal 
system conditions to find a matching set. This kind of search will 
be called symptomatic search. On the other hand, the search can be 
performed in the actual, maloperating system with reference to a 
template representing normal or planned operation. The change will 
then be found as a mismatch and identified by its location in the 
template. Consequently, this kind of search strategy is called 
topographic search. 
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The difference between the two kinds of search strategies is 
related to a basic difference in the use of the observed 
information. Every observation implies identification of an 
information source and reading of the content of the message. In 
symptomatic search, reference to the identity of system state is 
obtained from the message read; in topographic search, reference 
is taken from the topographic location of the source, while the 
messages are subject only to good/bad judgement which are used for 
tactical control of the search. 
Topographic Search 
The topographic search is performed by a good/bad mapping of the 
system through which the extent of the potentially "bad" field is 
gradually narrowed down until the location of the change is 
determined with sufficient resolution to allow selection of an 
appropriate counteraction. The domain or level of thinking in 
which the search is performed will vary. The search can be 
performed directly in the physical domain but, in most cases, the 
search is a mental operation at a level of abstraction which 
depends upon the immadiate goal and intention of the controller 
and upon the form of the reference map or model available. Also 
the resolution needed for the final location depends upon the 
actual circumstances. 
The topographic strategy is illustrated by the information flow 
graph of Fig.1. The main elements of the strategy which will be 
considered in more detail are the model of system used to 
structure the search, the kind of data used to represent the 
actual, failed plant state and the normal, reference state and, 
finally, the tactical process rules used to control the search 
sequence. 
The topographic search is performed as a go-'d/b&d mapping of the 
system which results in a stepwise limitation of the field of 
attention within which further search is to be considered. The 
search depends on a map of the system which gives information on 
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TOPOGRAPHIC SEARCH 
Failed system 
Judgement 
good/bad 
Identity 
Paths or 
Fields 
Only used it reference—* 
data are not immediately 
available 
Figure L Information flow map illustrating the topographic search 
strategy, which is based on good/bad judgements of variables along a 
path or of patterns related to a field. 
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the location of sources of potential observations for which 
reference information is available for judgements. The map is a 
model which identifies the potential sources of observations 
relative to the topology of the physical system itself, of its 
internal anatomical or functional structure, or of its external 
purposes. 
The search sequence is based on a set of, often heuristic, rules 
serving to limit the necessary field of attention. If different 
external functions can be related to separate internal parts or 
subsystems, a good/bad scan of external functions effectively 
identifies the internal field for further search. If a faulty 
input/output relation is found, the related causal route should De 
searched, e.g., by the half-split heuristic, etc. In the pure 
form, the tactical search decisions are based exclusively on the 
one bit of information obtained from the good/bad judgement of the 
individual observations. 
The information available in observations is used rather 
uneconomically by topographic strategies, since they depend only 
upon good/bad judgements. Furthermore, they do not take into 
account previously experienced faults and disturbances. Therefore, 
switching to other strategies may be necessary to reach an 
acceptable resolution of the search or to acquire good tactical 
guidance during the search. However, the topographic search is 
advantageous because of its dependence upon a model of normal 
plant operation - which can be derived during design or obtained 
by data collection during normal operation. Therefore, consistency 
and correctness of the strategy can be verified and, since it does 
not depend on models of malfunction, it will be less disturbed by 
multiple or "unknown" disturbances than strategies based on 
symptoms. 
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Symptomatic Search 
Symptomatic search strategies are based on the information content 
of observations to obtain a direct identification of the system 
state, instead of the location of the information source in a 
topographic map. The search decisions are derived from the 
internal relationship in data sets and not from the topological 
structure of system properties. In principle, a search is made 
through a set of abnormal data sets, symptoms, to find the set 
which matches the actual observed pattern of system behaviour. The 
reference patterns can be collected empirically from system 
caloperation or derived by analysis or simulation of the system's 
response to postulated disturbances. Furthermore reference 
patterns can be generated on-line if the contr> ler has a 
functional model available which can be modified to match a 
current hypothesis about the disturbance. 
When the diagnosis is performed in the dat? domain by a search 
through a library of symptom patterns, it has no logical relation 
to system function. The result is directly the label of the 
matching symptom pattern which may be in terms of cause, effect, 
location or the appropriate control action itself. Depending upon 
the structure of the controller and its memory, the search can be 
a parallel, data driven pattern recognition, or a sequential 
decision table search as illustrated by Fig.2. 
Pattern recognition plays an important role in human diagnosis; it 
can efficiently identify familiar system states and disturbances 
directly, but it is also used frequently during topographic search 
to guide tact i'-/•l decisions. Recognitions are then typically based 
on more fuzzy or general reference symptoms in terms of generic 
fault patterns referring to types of function or physical parts, 
such as noise characteristics, instability or forms of non-
linearity. 
Decision table search depends upon a set of tactical rules to 
guide the search which can be based on probability of occurrence, 
a hierarchical structuring of the attributes (like Linne's generic 
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PATTERN RECOGNITION 
{> label 
in terms of 
- cause, effect, 
event, state, 
action, ect. 
DECISION TABLE SEARCH 
Tactical 
Of Search 
Rules 
in terms of 
- cause, effect, 
event, state, 
action, ect 
Figure 2. Information flow maps for symptomatic diagnosis based on 
pattern recognition or search through a library of symptoms. 
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system for botanical identification as used in field guides), or 
functional relations, stored as fault trees, etc. Human 
diagnosticians probably would use decision tables for verification 
of more ambiguous recognitions. 
If a search is based on reference patterns generated "on-line" by 
modification of a functional model in correspondance with a 
postulated disturbance, the strategy can be called search by 
hypothesis and test as illustrated in Fig.3. The efficiency of 
this type of search depends upon the tactics of generating 
hypotheses. Typically, in human diagnosis, hypotheses result from 
uncertain topographic search or fuzzy recognitions. 
Symptomatic search is advantageous from the point of view of 
information economy, and a precise identification can frequently 
be obtained in a one-shot decision. One serious limitation will be 
that a reference pattern of the actual abnormal state of operation 
must be available, and multiple faults and disturbances must be 
considered. This means that reference sets must be prepared by 
analysis or recorded from prior occurrences. Or, the reference 
sets can be generated on-line by means of a functional model of 
the system which can be modified on occasion to simulate the 
abnormal system state in accordance with the current hypothesis. 
The differences in resource requirements for the different 
strategies are illustrated in Fig.4. Thus, in practise, the choice 
of strategy will usually be based on an "available resource" vs 
"demand" match. 
Diagnostic Search Strategies and Diagnostic Rules 
Tactical search rules, when used for diagnostic purposes, can in 
principle be of two different types: algorithms and heuristics. 
HYPOTHESIS & TEST 
r** Accept 
- ^ hypothesis 20 
Generate 
Hyp 
From other 
search strategies 
Figure 3. Information flow map for symptomatic search by 
hypothesis and test. The figure illustrates a conceptual test. In 
practice, the test may be performed by correcting the system according 
to the hypothesis and test for normal, instead of modifying the model 
as shown. 
——__^_^ STRATEGY 
PERFORMANCE FACTOR-" ~ ^__^ 
TIME SPENT 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
DEPENDENCY ON PATTERN PERCEPTION 
LOAD UPON SHORT TERK MEMORY 
COMPLEXITY OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
COMPLEXITY OF FUNCTIONAL MODEL 
CENERAL APPLICABILITY OF TACTICAL RULES 
DEPENDENCY ON MALFUNCTION EXPERIENCE 
DEPENDENCY ON MALFUNCTION PRt-ANALYSIS 
TOPOGRAPHIC 
SEARCH 
-
HIGH 
-
LOW 
LOW 
LOW 
HIGH 
LOW 
-
RECOGNITION 
LOW 
LOW 
HIGH 
LOW 
LOW 
-
-
HIGH 
-
DECISION 
TABLE 
-
-
-
HIGH 
-
-
-
-
HIGH 
HYPOTHESIS 
AND TEST 
. 
LOW 
-
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
LOW 
LOW 
-
Figure 4 . The table illustrates the difference in resource 
requirements of the various diagnostic strategies which makes possible 
a resource/demand matching by proper choice of strategy. Features not 
filled in are either not typical, being dependent on circumstances, or 
not relevant. 
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The former are defined as: 
Rules which when executed in the appropr Late sequence, either 
produce a solution or terminate at a defined failure point. 
This means that, when applying a set of algorithms to a problem, 
either a solution is found or the search finished at a 
predetermined point; i.e., the correct diagnosis will result every 
time the appropriate algorithms are used. 
As opposed to this straightforward type of rule, the heuristic 
tactical search rule is defined as: 
A personal guiding instruction for managing information processing 
and the appropriate action to be carried out in diagnosing the 
present state of a system. 
Here there is no guarantee that the application of the rule will 
automatically lead to the solution of the problem. The rule will 
only function as a support when, for instance, trying to diagnose 
a disturbance within a technical system. Since this type of rule 
will be examined in connection with the diagnosis of plant state 
in the LIT-U empirical investigation, it will be called a 
diagnostic rule. 
It is obvious that an operator will face and use both types of 
rules in his everyday practical work with the technical system. In 
a very general and rough way, one might say that the operator is 
constantly trying to discover algorithms amongst the heuristic 
rules he applies. When an algorithm is found in this way, it can 
then, for instance, be formulated as an instruction for dealing 
with the technical system. Even though this is important for 
diagnostic purposes, the search situations containing algorithms 
will not be included in the following discussion. As a 
consequence, when discussing search strategies and diagnostic 
rules, these terms refer to heuristics only. 
22 
Each search strategy has in principal its corresponding diagnostic 
rules in a specific search situation. When carrying out a search 
within a technical system according to a certain strategy, a 
typical set of diagnostic rules are used by the operators. 
However, as pointed out in the definition of diagnostic rules, 
these are "personal guiding instructions"; therefore the 
individual operator will add his own rules to the set of coason 
rules for each strategy. Thus the diagnostic rules within a 
certain search strategy consist of a core of rules used by all 
operators plus a set of individual rules which night vary from 
operator to operator. 
This classification will later be put into a practical .ontext. 
namely in the construction of diagnostic rules for use in nuclear 
power station disturbances. 
Situations In Which Diagnostic Rules Can Be Used 
The situations in which operators experience uncertainty in 
disturbed system states have previously been mentioned in this 
paper. This uncertainty stems from the fact that the operators 
have no guide-lines, the application of which would entirely 
resolve the disturbed situation. Instead, they have to approach 
the disturbance using methods which cannot guarantee high solution 
success rates. Thus, systematically constructed and applied 
heuristic diagnostic rules can support operators of technical 
systems in the following situations: 
a. When a deviation from normal indications has just started. 
In such a situation, instructions are seldom available. As it is 
often best to treat a disturbance as soon as possible, the 
operators regard a systematic method for data collection as 
especially useful. The disturbance has, in such a case, not yet 
developed sufficiently to influence all parameters, which means 
that a complete symptom picture may not be available. It is 
therefore imperative to prevent hasty decisions and "jumping to 
conclusions". 
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b. When the symptoms of the disturbance cause are not covered by 
instructions. 
In this situation, the operators face symptoms which are not, or 
are only partially, covered by instructions. As Mentioned earlier, 
this emphasises the importance of structured and thorough data 
collection and a clear awareness of the over-all symptom picture. 
The potential danger of "fitting-in suitable information" in order 
to get the "right" characteristics for a certain disturbance cause 
is especially important in these circumstances. 
c. When there is uncertainty about which of many alternatives is 
the correct or the important one. 
In this case the operators require adequate data in order to 
discriminate between the correct or more probable alternative and 
the other ones. This demands an overview of what the alternatives 
consist of as well as a selection of data within each alternative 
in such a way that the correct or more probable alternative can be 
identified. The manner of using and combining data is crucial and 
highlights the importance of acquiring relevant bits of 
information while neglecting unimportant data. 
d. When external and other factors disturb or negatively 
influence the disturbance treatment. 
Such factors aggravate the disturbance treatment by interrupting 
the operators' detection process or by decreasing their efficiency 
in these processes. Examples of the latter are operator 
coordination insufficiencies, operators dispatched to other tasks 
in or outside the control room. 
Furthermore* stress, caused by a rapidly developing disturbance 
for example, or subjectively induced by the operators' strong 
desire to solve and quickly correct the disturbance, puts a strain 
on the accuracy of disturbance treatment. Therefore, the operators 
need a clear procedure which they can follow and return to when 
interruptions occur. 
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The practical implementation of heuristic diagnostic rules in 
technical disturbance procedures requires a number of 
considerations, such as operator training aspects, coordinations 
of these rules with instructions and operator team utilization 
aspects. Some of these considerations are discussed later in this 
paper. 
Types of Diagnostic Rules 
Diagnostic rules can be organized on a scale ranging from general 
to specific. A possible classification is shown below: 
Type of rule Classification Definition 
Plant non-specific General Independent of 
- type of plant 
- type of process 
Plant specific Operational Independent of process 
but dependent on plant 
(e.g. nuclear processes) 
System specific Specific Dependent of both plant 
and process 
In addition, rules can be aimed at supporting specific phases of 
the problem solving/decision making sequence - e.g., observation, 
identification, evaluation, task definition, etc. 
Diagnostic Rules as Part of the Diagnostic Search 
When a disturbance occurs in a technical system, it constitutes a 
threat to or a deviation from the purposes of the technical 
system. The goal of the operator is therefore to handle the 
disturbance in an appropriate way. This includes identification of 
the souree(s) of the disturbance and a rectifying action. To be 
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able to carry out these two activities, the operator has to assess 
the nature of the disturbance, i.e. to "diagnose" the 
characteristics of the disturbance. This is done by searching 
within the technical system and the whole procedure is called a 
diagnostic search supported by diagnostic rules. Such support will 
require that the diagnostic rules 
cover sufficiently the entire diagnostic search sequence. 
imply methods for putting priorities on different parts of the 
information available. 
To fulfill these two criteria, the diagnostic rules have to be 
adapted to the various stages within the diagnostic search. As 
diagnostic search is a problem solving procedure, the basis for 
thi3 adaptation is the problem solving sequence itself. Thus the 
different steps within the problem solving sequence have their 
corresponding steps in the diagnostic search sequence and will be 
called diagnostic phases. Each diagnostic phase has a number of 
diagnostic units which correspond to the decisions within each 
step of the problem solving sequence. Finally, each diagnostic 
unit contains the smallest part within a diagnostic search 
sequence which is the diagnostic rule as such. 
With the heuristic approach, the method in itself only describes 
the way in which to use the available information in order to 
reach the solution; as a result the diagnostic search sequence has 
to be linked up with the information required to carry out the 
diagnosis. There are therefore two main aspects of such a search 
sequence; the informative aspect, which refers to the information 
necessary to perform the search (technical data, knowledge about 
the system and its behaviour etc.) and the procedural aspect, 
which refers to the heuristic method itself. 
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Construction of Diagnostic Rules 
The definition of the target training group and its needs for 
diagnostic training are used as starting points in the 
construction of sets of rules to be used during training. The 
construction sequence could be carried out as follows: 
Data collection concerning desired behaviour repertoire 
Having determined the area of interest for diagnosis, contacts are 
made with responsible representatives and crews at an appropriate 
nuclear power station in order to obtain permission to carry out 
the data collection. During these contacts, the same 
considerations as discussed above concerning training initiative 
and motivation should be borne in mind. The outcome of the 
diagnostic rule construction is highly dependent on this stage and 
it is therefore vital that the data collection results mirror 
normal conditions as far as possible. The data collection is then 
performed using one of a variety of methods or combinations of, 
for example, interviews or observations. If the person carrying 
out the data collection is not completely familiar technically 
with the system in question, a second person with such knowledge 
should assist during the collection of data. 
Only the situations in which the observed or interviewed crews 
have made correct diagnoses and adequate rectifying actions are 
considered for the subsequent construction of diagnostic rules. It 
is essential that collected data covers as many aspects of the 
diagnostic situation as possible. Each stage of the diagnostic 
seqence should be considered several times in order to catch 
nuances in the way the crews handle them. After each individual 
observation or interview, a rough evaluation of the data collected 
can be made in order to establish how well the different stages 
have been covered. This evaluation points to those areas which are 
deserving of concentration during the next observation or 
interview. 
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Outlining the first version 
Basic data from the collection are organised initially by stating 
the respective diagnostic phases. In general, these are the same 
as the main stages in the search which are themselves based on 
logical steps in fault finding activities. It is therefore likely 
that the observed situation can be structured according to the 
general search sequence, at least initially until the data give 
other impulses. Under each diagnostic phase, headline data are 
reformulated into statements based on what was observed. These 
statements are short sentences describing a certain search 
activity carried out by the observed or interviewed crews. The 
next step is to look for similarities between and common patterns 
among the statements. Similarities are assumed to show fruitful 
search actions and patterns indicate among other things sequential 
events during the fault finding activity. The basic assumption is 
that the more similarities and patterns, the stronger indication 
of successful search activities. Similar statements are grouped 
together under each phase headline and arranged in an order 
corresponding to the patterns. A statement covering the other 
statements in each group is picked out and used as a headline 
labelling the diagnostic unit. The remaining statements in each 
diagnostic unit are now scrutinised from a qualitative point of 
view. From statements covering the same diagnostic element, the 
most complete is picked out. The principle is to obtain sequential 
statements which seem to describe the totality of the respectiva 
diagnostic unit. When all units are organised the complete 
diagnostic sequence is put together to form the first version. 
This version has now to be evaluated by a group of professionals 
having extensive experience with diagnostic searches in the same 
type of nuclear power station as used for the data collection. 
Their task is to judge the informative value of the first version 
as regards logic and coverage of the diagnostic rules within the 
sequence. All comment? are noted during the discussion and later 
reviewed to check their relevance. There are great advantages at 
this stage in testing the diagnostic rules in a simulator by 
following the transient's development parallel to the application 
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of the rules and at the same time noting the professionals' 
comments. 
The second version 
Comments obtained from the evaluation of the first version are now 
taken into consideration for further refinement resulting in a 
second version. If the reference group regarded some parts of the 
sequence as incomplete, it might be necessary to collect more data 
through observation or interview as before. Even those statements 
previously excluded could be used if the reference group gives 
indications which seem to justify their inclusion. After 
modifications are made, the complete second version is ready to be 
tested in practical circumstances, frequently in full scale 
simulators. 
Testing of the second version 
Control room crews at the same or an identical nuclear power 
station should be involved in testing the second version. In 
principle two types of methods can be used to evaluate the rules 
and their interaction with the operators' handling of disturbances 
- subjective comments via questionnaires, interviews, etc and/or 
observation by instructors or other experts. One can use control 
groups (who do not receive special training in diagnostic rules) 
and compare their performance with an experimental group which has 
received special instruction. In addition, one has to select an 
appropriate set of transients on the simulator for which the 
crews' performance will be evaluated. 
The possibilities for various test procedures are of course 
numerous. The main points in all test variants are: to obtain 
opinions about the usefulness of the rules, their logical order 
and the degree to which they cover the transients. By using 
crews who have not received training in diagnostic rules, it 
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is possible to check various aspects of transients exercised in 
the simulator, e.g. degree of difficulty, realism etc. 
Modification of the second version 
From the results of the test of the second version, at least three 
conclusions can be drawn: whether the utilisation of rules has 
improved the crew's possibilities of coping with the transients 
and if so, in what way the diagnostic rules were used during the 
transients and finally, any remaining deficiencies concerning the 
diagnostic rule coverage and structure. The two latter aspects are 
focusssd on for further refinement of the diagnostic rules. The 
crews' performance during the transients will suggest appropriate 
adjustments to the sequential order and content of the rules. 
Clues about discontinuities in the set of rules, largely based on 
remarks and opinions from the crews, can be used to secure a 
logical chain of rules covering the entire diagnostic search 
sequence. The second version is then rewritten to form the final 
version of the diagnostic rule sets. 
Practical use of the final version 
The final version can now be implemented in training schemes, 
either as part of existing formalised training programmes for 
nuclear power plant crews or as more isolated courses. 
It is obvious that a number of different methods can be used to 
evaluate and modify the diagnostic rule sets. For example, a very 
important part is the data collection in its initial phase. This 
is probably best achieved through semi-structured interviews or 
observation of operators performing fault-finding activities in 
their usual environment. A more detailed example of one such 
method, put into practice, is given in the following section on 
empiric studies. In addition, see the section on Project 3 
performed by the OECD Halden Reactor Project. 
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Relation to other Work 
The importance of the area of diagnosis and trouble-shooting is 
reflected in the breadth of the research which has been carried 
out over the past twenty or more years. Much of this work has been 
government-sponsored because of concern about the increasingly 
large expenditures which are becoming common for the maintenance 
and repair of modern military systems - expenditures which often 
amount to several multiples of the original purchase price. 
However, there have also been reports of research which are more 
directly related to industrial applications - in particular, 
chemical plants and nuclear power stations. Two such activities 
are especially relevant in connection with the LIT-4 work being 
reported here. 
Duncan (1980) and Duncan & Gray (1975) report on the results of 
some studies of training for fault diagnosis in the chemical 
process plant area. In essence they were interested in comparing 
the effects of utilizing different sorts of background knowledge 
during the training of operators as a potential aid in their 
subsequent ability to diagnose plant faults. Thus of three groups 
of trainees, the "theory" and the "rules" groups were given a 
simplified account of how the plant worked in terms of inputs, 
outputs, product flows, control loops, etc. In addition the 
"rules" group exercised in applying diagnostic rules of the type 
illustrated below. The third group received no prior instruction 
of either sort. 
Diagnostic rules 
(1) Scan the panels to locate the general area of failure. 
(2) Check all control loops in the affected area. Are there any 
anomalous valve positions? 
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(3) High level in a vessel and low flow in the associated take-
off line indicates either a pump failure or valve failed 
"closed". If valves OK (see (2)), then pump failure is the 
probable diagnosis. 
(1) High temperature and pressure in a column head associated 
with low level in the reflex drum indicates overhead 
condenser failure - provided all pumps and valves are 
working correctly (see (2) and (3)). 
(5) If the failure is in the Reactor/Heat-Exchange complex, 
determine whether it is in the reactor or the hea'„-exchange 
system. A failure in the heat-exchange will produce symptoms 
in Column A but not in B. A failure in the reactor will 
produce symptoms in both columns. 
(6) If the failure is in the feed system, check whether it is in 
stream X or Y. Decause of the nature of the control system, 
a failure in Y will produce associated symptoms in both X 
and Y streams. A failure in X will sho» symptoms in the X 
stream only. 
It will be noted that the diagnostic rules differ in generality. 
The first four are rather general. The last two are plant-
specific and attempt to assist the operator in dealing with system 
complexity caused by the presence of feed-forward and feed-back 
control loops. 
Fig.5 indicates the results of a test which followed the training 
session. These suggest Ihat explicit information in the form of 
instruction prior to pi-'-itice is effective for NEW faults not 
previously seen by the operators during practice. While 
explanation of how the plant works had some effect, the most 
encouraging performance was achieved by including information in 
the form of the diagnostic rules shown above. 
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MEAN CORRECT 
DIAGNOSES 
OLD OLD 
NEW 
OLD 
NEW 
NEW 
NO STORY THEORY "RULES 
figure 5. Fault diagnosis following three training regimes. 
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The other study which will be mentioned is from the extensive 
research of Rouse and his colleagues - see e.g. Morris and Rouse 
(1985). This particular work deals with the development and 
evaluation of a fuzzy rule-based model of human problem solving 
(Hunt & Rouse (1982)) which is based on diagnostic strategy 
studies by Rasmussen (1979). Of special interest here is the fact 
that the proposed model was designed to search in two different 
mod a s - namely a symptomatic search based on the state of the 
system and a topographic search which relied also on the structure 
of the system. The model is sketched in Fig.6. 
PROBLEM 
CONSIDER 
STATE 
INFORMATION 
ANY 
FAMILIAR 
PATTERNS 
no 
CONSIDER 
STRUCTURAL 
INFORMATION 
yes APPLY 
APPROPRIATE 
S-RULE 
APPLY 
APPROPRIATE 
T-RULE 
Figure 6 
An example of an S-rule, e.g., in connection with automobile 
diagnosis, might be (in production rule form): 
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IF: the engine will not start - and 
the starter motor is turning - and 
the battery is strong 
THEN: check the gas gauge. 
A comparable T-rule could be: 
IF: the output of X is bad - and 
X depends on Y and Z - and 
Y is known to be working 
THEN: Check Z. 
Rouse points out that S-rules are context-specific since they 
relate to specific features within a given problem area. On the 
other hand, T-rules can be considered as context-free since they 
do not contain such specific references and thus can be used more 
generally in many situations. S-rules come with experience as sets 
of pattern recognition rules which map specific plant state to a 
corresponding hypothesis or an action. On the other hand, people 
have to be trained to use T-rules AND, most importantly, to know 
when they should attempt to use them; i.e. to recognize when their 
available library of S-rules or pattern matches is not sufficient. 
Rouse argues for a mixed-fidelity approach to training operators 
in problem solving - ranging from a zero-fidelity simulator with 
no context to a moderate-fidelity simulator with the right context 
for problem-solving (although not necessarily for control and 
manipulation) and then finally to a high-fidelity unit for final 
checking. See Rouse (1982). He favors a approach to training which 
emphasizes general diagnostic skills, based on training in varying 
problem contexts and thus supporting the use of topological-
related rather than symptom-based strategies. 
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Training of Diagnostic Rules 
Basic Concepts and Purposes in Training 
In a now classic and often quoted definition, Gagne (1965) stated 
that: 
" — learning is a change in human disposition or capability 
which can be retained and which is not simply ascribable to 
the process of growth. The change may be, and often is, an 
increased capability for some type of performance. It may also 
be an altered disposition of the sort called 'attitude* or 
'interest' or 'value'. 
The change must have more than momentary permanence; it must 
be capable of being retained over some period of time." 
In this paper the concept of "human disposition" will be referred 
to as knowledge and attitudes, i.e. denotative and connotative 
aspects of the phenomenon, for example technical system procedure 
and data. "Capability" indicates the mental and physiological 
functions necessary to obtain the knowledge at a conscious level. 
The "increased capability for some type of performance" mentioned 
in the definition could, in everyday language, be expressed as a 
person becoming better or more thorough or able to cover a broader 
aspect of the trained performance. The "permanence aspect" of the 
change will simply be interpreted as the degree to which the 
learned material is manifest over time. 
Applied to the context of diagnostic search in technical systems, 
this means that the training of operators will focus on increasing 
their ability to cope with disturbed system states. Special onus 
will then be placed on diagnostic search within technical systems 
subjected to unfamiliar disturbances to which instructions are 
not, or are only partially, applicable. 
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The training will therefore include the nature, content and 
application of heuristic diagnostic rules. This is done during 
training by providing the operators with information about the 
diagnostic search and rules in order to increase the operators' 
knowledge in this area and to create a positiv? attitude to the 
utilization of diagnostic search and rules, i.e. a change in the 
"human dispositions", to quote Gagne. The "capability** aspect, 
which refers to obtaining this knowledge at a conscious level, is 
covered in training by applying the diagnostic methods to 
realistic examples, either in real-life situations or by using a 
simulator. The purpose is to practise with these examples to such 
an extent that heuristic methods become a part of the operators' 
normal search behaviour, i.e. manifest over time. 
Understanding and application of Diagnostic Search in 
Training and in Real-Life Situations 
Changes in human dispositions and capabilities are in principle of 
two different types as seen from a qualitative point of view: 
Changes which include the alteration of internal parts or 
elements within dispositions and capabilities but which will 
not change the totality of these dispositions and capabilities 
(Type I changes). 
Changes of internal parts or elements in dispositions and 
capabilities, causing a fundamental change in the totality of 
the dispositions and capabilities (Type II changes). 
These two types of changes correspond roughly to the Piagetian 
concepts of assirailation and accommodation respectively. The 
former means that new information is interpreted according to 
existing standards in the dispositions and yet is too apparent to 
be ignored. Thus, a reconstruction or change of the dispositions 
is demanded. To put it crudely, assimilation vis-a-vis training 
means that the trainee has become more knowledgable within and 
according to the structure of the subject concerned, ås far as 
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accomodation is concerned, it follows that the trainee has 
altered the entire structure of the subject and consequently 
rearranged his knowledge according to the altered structure. The 
two concepts, assimilation and accomodation, are of importance in 
two fundamental aspects of training: 
As requirement for understanding and profiting from the 
training content. 
It is reasonable to assume that understanding and application of 
algorithmic diagnostic rules, i.e. in practice, operating 
instructions, are based on other dispositions and capabilities 
than understanding and application of heuristic diagnostic rules. 
The reason for this assumption lies in the main difference between 
the natures of the two types of rules: While the application of 
algorithmic rules leads to the solution, the use of heuristic 
rules, more or less explicitly, pinpoints the methods of finding 
the solution to a disturbance situation. Hence greater capability 
demands are placed on the operator in the latter case. Obviously, 
these demands will also occur during training of diagnostic 
search. If an operator is simply trying to assimilate the 
heuristic diagnostic search methods by adapting them to his 
algorithmic method disposition and capability structure, there 
will be no relevant understanding of, or profit from, the 
training. 
As requirements during practical application within the 
technical system 
This concerns the impact of training, i.e. the extent to which the 
operator will apply diagnostic search in general and heuristic 
diagnostic rules in particular to real-life system disturbances 
after diagnostic search training has been given. In his every-day 
work the operator will experience disturbance situations, to which 
both types of diagnostic rules must be applied. To optimize 
disturbance solution probability, it is therefore necessary to 
define and distinguish between the situations in which the 
respective diagnostic rules should be used. 
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The difference in denands on dispositions and capabilities between 
the two types of rules could probably be explained in terms of 
differences in required cognitive process levels. These cognitive 
levels could be organised in hierarchical or taxonomical 
structures, as in Bloom's cognitive taxonomy for instance. The 
main headlines in this taxonomy are given below: 
Knowledge 
. Knowledge of specifics 
Knowledge of terminology 
Knowledge of specific facts 
. Knowledge of ways and means of dealing with specifics 
Knowledge of conventions 
Knowledge of trends and sequences 
Knowledge of classifications and categories 
Knowledge of criteria 
Knowledge of methodology 
. Knowledge of the universals and abstractions in a field 
Knowledge of principles and generalisations 
Knowledge of theories and structures 
Comprehension 
. Translation 
. Interpretation 
. Extrapolation 
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Analysis 
. Analysis of elements 
. Analysis of relationships 
. Analysis of organizational principles 
Synthesis 
. Production of unique communication 
. Production of a plan or proposed set of operations 
. Derivation of a set of abstract relations 
Evaluation 
. Judgement in terms of internal evidence 
. Judgement in terms of external criteria 
As the procedural aspect of an algorithmic diagnostic rule is 
normally implied in an instruction or in a check-list, for 
instance, the operator's main concern is the informative aspect. 
These two aspects correspond to capability and disposition 
respectively in a diagnostic search sequence. Therefore the 
operator will therefore mainly use cognitive processes at the 
levels of knowledge, comprehension and analysis in order to 
identify the disturbance systems as belonging to a certain 
disturbance type. In a disturbed situation demanding the 
application of heuristic diagnostic rules, both aspects have to be 
dealt with by the operator. Now he must not only identify the 
disturbance symptoms but also synthesize these symptoms in order 
to "produce a plan or a proposed set of operations", to use 
Bloom's terminolology: hence the difference in cognitive levels 
and consequently different demands on the operator. These 
different cognitive levels and corresponding demands must be 
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considered and used explicitly in the practical training situation 
in order to increase the probability of understanding and future 
application of diagnostic search. 
Diagnostic Search Training Strategies and Methods 
The term "training method" is often used in a number of different 
contexts and meanings which can sometimes be confusing. In this 
paper, it will therefore be defined as follows: 
-Training method will refer to the didactic methods used by a 
teacher or an instructor in direct interaction with trainees, 
i.e. the various methods used by an instructor in order to 
present data and information to the trainees. These methods 
are based on experience and research work concerning human 
perception and learning processes in practical training 
situations. 
-Training strategy is defined as an overall principle, in 
accordance with which a specific training content is analysed 
and structured. 
In planning and preparations, the training strategy is used in 
order to structure the training content according to a chosen 
overall principle while training methods are tools for the actual 
presentation of the content to the trainees. A certain training 
strategy has its corresponding methods or set of such methods. 
Thus, a training strategy is selected first and appropriate 
training methods are then determined accordingly. The choice of 
training strategy is highly dependent on what type of change is 
required to achieve a certain diagnostic search behaviour. From a 
practical and simplified point of view, it is a question of 
whether the existing operator search behaviour demands a Type I 
change (assimilation) or a Type II change (accomodation) in order 
to meet the requirements for that certain search behaviour. To 
answer this question the present operator search behaviour has to 
be evaluated and compared to the desired search behaviour. 
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In the case of assimilation, two sub-types can distinguished: to 
add information without intending or expecting to change behaviour 
as opposed to adding information with the intention of altering 
behaviour within existing disposition structures. Hence the 
following three main training strategies: 
Presentation of facts: This strategy is used when "accumulative 
learning" is intended. The purpose is to add new information and 
data to enable the operator to anchor more solidly his present 
search behaviour within his broader knowledge. Change of search 
cehaviour is neither implied nor expected. 
Adaptive training strategy: New information and date are presented 
with the intention of changing certain parts of the disposition 
structure without altering its totality. This is done by 
assimilating facts in accordance with present structure. 
Confrontative training strategy: This strategy derives its name 
from the "confrontation" of new information to existing 
disposition structure. The new information is deliberately 
presented to the trainees in such a way that their existing 
disposition structure cannot assimiltate the information. The 
presentation will also ensure that the information cannot be 
ignored. This is done In order to achieve accommodation, i.e. a 
complete change of the disposition structure. 
As mentioned previously, the actual implementation of these 
strategies is, done by choosing training methods in accordance 
with the nature of the training strategy. It goes without saying 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to outline these training 
methods without knowing the specific training situation and its 
strategies. 
Training methods consist mainly of activities which are introduced 
by the instructor in a predetermined order. Examples of such 
activities are lectures, group discussions, group work, laboratory 
experiments, scenarios, individual work, programmed training, 
field exercises, demonstrations and study visits. 
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Training Initative and Motivation 
The key factor influencing motivation for behaviour change has 
previously been said to b*» discovery of discrepancies between 
present and desired behaviour. Training could then be a means of 
achieving behaviour change. But on whose initiative? The question 
is justified for many reasons but only the strict training aspect 
will be discussed here. There are a number of representatives from 
different groups who can point out training needs: the crew 
members themselves, labour unions, training organisation at the 
utility, plant management, central training organisations, 
government nuclear power authorities, research projects etc. As 
training results are highly dependent on degree of both general 
motivation for training and specific motivation for diagnostic 
rules, it is worth examining the motivational aspect a little 
closer. 
Some aspects contribute to make the issues of training initiative 
and motivation slightly sensitive. 
The subject in itself. 
The nature of the subject diagnostic search/rules is somewhat 
different from those normally covered in nuclear power station 
training. It includes issues which have bearing on more personal 
individual matters than technical subjects. 
The mere fact that it comprises fewer "truths valid for all kinds 
of situations" could give it a reputation of being of little value 
in practical situations. 
Priority. 
The time available for control room crew training is fairly 
limited. The number of technical refinements and changes at the 
plant over a period of time is normally of such magnitude that 
instructors in training organisations find it necessary to 
allocate most of the time available to these changes. As training 
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of diagnostic rules has not been carried out before, it will be 
accorded a low priority under these circumstances. 
Other aspects. 
Perhaps of a more subtle nature but still valid is the point that 
diagnostic rule training may be regarded as a sign of imperfection 
in the crew's professionalism. This is especially relevant when a 
person from another field of work and/or with a different 
professional background points out the need for diagnostic rule 
training. 
An even more subtle aspect is the image of complete safety in the 
running of nuclear power stations, maintained for the public's 
benefit by the utilities and goverment authorities. In 
Scandinavia, for example, this issue is of great importance due to 
its political sensitivity. The introduction of diagnostic rule 
training, with its less "stringent" nature, could be interpreted 
as resorting to methods which contradict repeated assurances of 
safety. 
It goes without saying that the best basis for training of 
diagnostic rules from a motivational point of view is a request 
for such training by the crew themselves. The attitudes behind 
such request are then based or the fact that the crews want to 
learn the methods involved because it would have an instrumental 
function in dealing with disturbances. If dictated by others, 
defensive attitudes in the crew members could easily result. This 
kind of attitude is dominated by its affective component which is 
much more difficult to deal with than a knowledge- related 
attitude. Once evoked, it is fed by more or less logical reasoning 
derived, for instance, from opinions mentioned above about the 
subject per se or other aspects. 
As a result, therefore, it is of great importance to ensure that 
the crew'a decision to participate in diagnostic rule training is 
built on knowledge-related attitudes. This requires both avoidance 
of conditions which create the formation of other attitude types 
and an appeal to fact-related circumstances experienced by the 
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crews during fault finding activities. Complementary knowledge and 
methods should be discussed rather than a crew's errors of 
judgement. The latter will be brought up anyway during the 
training but then often by the crews themselves in order to 
exemplify situations in which diagnostic guidance is of positive 
value. Initial and preparatory contacts should be made either 
directly with the crews or via representatives who are "incluled 
in value-expressive attitudes". If possible the contacts should be 
made personally and in "face-to-face" situations followed up by 
extensive written information about the training to come. Channels 
of communication between the crews and training organisers should 
be opened and their use encouraged throughout the period before 
the start of the training. Thus, the leading principle during the 
preparations for the diagnostic rule training is to provide as 
much information as possible aiming for knowledge-related 
attitudes and to reinforce the cognitive component in positive 
object-instrumental attitudes. 
Training definition and analysis 
The purposes of this definition and analysis are related to 
decisions necessarily made during other preparatory analyses and 
activities concerning the training of diagnostic rules: 
Goal analysis 
Content analysis 
Group composition 
Training methods 
Even though training of diagnostic rules could be held at a very 
general level, i.e. applicable to a variety of technical systems, 
the use of examples during the training requires a common frame of 
reference for the trainees. This indicates a preference for groups 
which are homogeneous in a number of aspects, for example with 
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reference to work content, educational background, previous 
experience and so forth. The definition of the training target 
group will therefore be based on personal factors concerning the 
potential participants in the training. In a nuclear power 
station, it is advantageous to split up the staff in accordance 
with work content rather than attachment to, for example, reactor 
units. 
The subsequent goal analysis is in some cases based on 
discrepancies between present and desired behaviour repertoires: 
an analysis of requirements in order to change the present 
repertoire is therefore necessary. If it is vital that the present 
repertoire is defined in very precise terms, the analysis could be 
quite extensive and therefore time consuming. Normally a rough 
idea is sufficient because of the stronger emphasis on the 
objectives of the training, i.e. achievement of the desired 
behaviour repertoire. In the practical training situation, it is 
in *ny case very difficult to allow for individual differences in 
behaviour repertoires. A solution to this difficulty couid be to 
use some kind of estimated "average level" when comparing present 
and desired behaviour repertoires. 
Setting up training goals 
In order to determine training goals, a general overall goal for 
the diagnostic rule training is first formulated, e.g.: 
Training of control room staff in the nature and application of 
diagnostic search methods in order to facilitate constructive and 
adequate search behavior re-pertoires during disturbances of 
various types. 
This sentence provides material for the breakdown process starting 
with main goal categories and ending with basic elements. In the 
second level subcategorical goals are stated in terms of 
knowledge, skills and attitudes preferred in the different types 
of disturbances. At the basic element level these preferences are 
46 
broken down into further quantitative and qualitative detail which 
is later used as a base for the instructor's lecture plans. As the 
goals are directly dependent on preconditions derived from 
previous training analyses concerning a certain training target 
group, only examples of training goal descriptions can be given 
here. 
Main Purpose of Diagnostic Application Weaknesses 
categories diagnostic search of diagnostic in human 
search sequences rules fault 
methods finding 
behaviour 
1st level General Levels of Situations 
sub- and specif ic human control 
categories purposes actions 
Stress and 
its various 
types 
Advantages Content of Rules at Effects of 
search different stress 
sequence levels 
Practical 
outcome 
examples 
Decision 
sequence 
Applying 
rules 
Weaknesses 
in induction 
and other 
processes 
Exercising 
rule use 
Other 
weakness 
At the remaining two levels, the stated subgoals are further 
specified in the respective dimensions of knowledge, skills and 
attitudes. A practical example of this is found in a later section 
of this report. 
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Training content and methods 
Based on the detailed goal specifications obtained at the basic 
goal element level, a training syllabus is drafted for an overview 
of how the training will be carried out in practice. This draft 
shows the different training items in the chronological order in 
which they will be considered during the training. The criteria 
applied in arranging training items in chronological order are 
based on logical reasoning and past experience arising from the 
impact of this kind of training. It is, in other words, fairly 
difficult to state an exact rule for the order of training items 
in general. In practical circumstances a preliminary version of 
the training is made and tested using participants from roughly 
the same target group as is intended for the final training. 
Results from this test run are then used as a basis for alteration 
of the training content. 
The training content draft is analysed item for item to determine 
each item's applicability learning aspects ("internal factors") 
and the method of communication to training participants 
("external factors"). 
Internal factors External factors 
Degree of abstraction 
required for understanding 
and coping with the training 
Learning level with regard 
to participant learning 
exercises in practical terms 
Type of mental processes 
involved in learning of 
training items 
Type of general training 
method appropriate for exer-
cising the respective training 
items 
Taxonomicial level of the 
different training items 
Type of teaching method 
required 
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- Type of behavioural change - Preserving proper motivation: 
required in order to comply material/exercises, general-
with the training item be- isation and reinforcement 
havioural implications 
- Audio-visual aids required 
for the respective training 
items 
When considering these factors from a practical point of view the 
analysis boils down to the following reasoning: 
Desired behaviour repertoire in diagrostic search 
Actual behaviour repertoire during diagnostic search 
= Required change in order to achieve the desired repertoire 
The words "required change" constitute all kinds of alterations 
including literary, behaviour changes, adding new behaviour or 
extinguishing present behaviour elements. In order to achieve this 
required change in an efficient and profound way, thf. training 
methods must correspond to the requirements of the respective 
training items. In the case of diagnostic rule training, the 
impact of the training will be superficial or non-existant if the 
correct training methods are not used. 
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Empirical Studies 
The main purpose of the LIT-4 project was twofold: to develop and 
test operator training methods concerning normal and disturbed 
conditions and to develop and test methods for systematic 
observation, analysis and interpretation of operator performance 
during training in a simulator. From a practical and a 
methodological point of view, the latter became a precondition for 
the former, i.e. in order to evaluate the developed training 
methods it was necessary to construct and use some kind of 
observation method. 
The general purpose of the empirical investigation was to evaluate 
different aspects of diagnostic search during disturbed system 
states. That is: 
a. To evaluate the utilization of diagnostic rules in connection 
with the diagnosis of disturbed system states. 
b. To evaluate the developed observation method during operator 
simulator training. 
c. To evaluate the content and realization of the diagnostic rule 
training course within the project. 
Later these aspects were broken down further into questions, 
expressed in operational terms, in order to facilitate assessment. 
The investigation was split up into the following phases: 
a. Preparations which included administrative contacts, 
diagnostic rule construction, preparations for training 
courses etc. 
b. Training courses for operators and instructors 
c. Data collecting 
so 
d. Analysis "»nd reporting of results 
The following groups participated: 
Control room staff from two PWR units at the nuclear power 
station at Ringhals in Sweden. The staff consisted of 59 
persons allocated to 1*1 crews at number 3 and 4 units. These 
units are virtually identical and are situated within 100 
metres of each other. Each crew taking part in the 
investigation consisted of a shift supervisor, two reactor 
operators and normally one turbine operator. Seven crews work 
in shifts at each unit. 
Instructors at the nuclear power station crew training centre, 
AKU. at Studsvik in Sweden. These instructors are involved in 
the annual retraining of all PWR crews in Sweden which takes 
one week. All in all, five PWR instructors participated in the 
data collecting as observers. 
LIT-4 project staff at Rise National Laboratory in Denmark. 
The field work and training courses were carried out by a 
Swedish member of the staff. 
The diagnostic rule construction was undertaken mainly at Ringhals 
in cooperation with three of the fourteen crews. The remaining 
eleven crews took part in the data collecting during their annual 
retraining at AKU. 
Meetings with crew members and instructors who participated in the 
investigation are scheduled for February 1986. The purpose of 
these meetings is to give a result feed-back and to discuss the 
results with the operators and the instructors. 
In the table below which shows the principal investigation 
variable set-up, the investigative methods will be described in 
the order in which they appear: 
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Independent 
variable 
Intermediate 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
Diagnostic 
rule training 
Utilization of 
diagnostic rules 
during simulator 
sessions 
Qualitative 
results of diag-
nostic rule 
utilization 
(requires 
appropriate 
and efficient 
training stra-
tegies. Methods 
and content) 
(requires 
appropriate 
observation 
methods etc.) 
(requires 
effective 
diagnostic 
rules) 
Sub-purpose c. Sub-purpose b. Sub-purpose a. 
Concerning sub-purpose a., the task was to find out whether 
instruction regarding a set of diagnostic rules improved the 
operators* treatment of simulated system disturbances. Two 
different methods were used in order to answer this question: 
Comparison between observed and registered treatment of 
disturbances of two groups, where one group had participated 
in diagnostic rule training. 
Collection of opinions from the group whose members had 
participated in diagnostic rule training concerning the 
support received and usefulness of these rules. 
The eleven crews participating in the data collecting were 
allocated to the experimental and the control groups by stratified 
sampling from each reactor unit in order to achieve two similar 
and comparable groups. Background and other factors were checked 
for the respective groups and found to be acceptably similar. The 
six crews in the experimental group and the remaining five in the 
control group participated in the data collecting as follows: 
52 
Experimental 
group 
Control 
group 
Project and data collecting 
information received Yes No 
Diagnostic rule training 
participation Yes No 
Observed during simulated 
disturbance treatment Yes Yes 
Disturbance treatment re-
sults calculated Yes Yes 
A criterion variable, containing four criteria, was set up in 
order to define the dependent variable in operational terms. These 
criteria were: elapsed time from the on-set of disturbance symptom 
to the operators' possible recognition of these symptoms; cause 
identification; understanding of cause consequences; and execution 
of disturbance counter-actions. 
Collection of crew-member opinions was made by using a number of 
questionnaires, containing a variety of disturbance cause and 
treatment questions formulated according to the Likert attitude 
scale technique. In principle, these questions were based on the 
diagnostic search sequence and the afore-mentioned criteria. 
Concerning sub-purpose b., the main task was to construct an 
observation form to be used initially for the LIT-4 project data 
collection and later by instructors during future simulator 
training. The following considerations were important: 
The observation form should be based on the diagnostic search 
sequence. 
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It should contain an explicit time scale in order to enable 
chronological recording of operator actions during the 
simulator session. 
It should provide opportunities to record simple qualitative 
operator action evaluations within each phase of the 
diagnostic search sequence. 
It should, in general, be easy to administer and fill in. 
It should be possible to make written remarks and explanations 
in a logical order and in a convenient space on the form. 
It should provide data about various technical aspects of the 
simulator session, such as crew identification, instructor, 
type of disturbance and time aspects of the observations. 
The form should allow for the utilization of easily-recalled 
symbols and filling-in techniques for the recording of all 
possible operator action types. 
Finally, sub-purpose c. required the construction of an 
appropriate diagnostic rule training course. As the duration of 
the diagnostic rule course was very short (5 hours), compromises 
concerning training strategy had to be made. One of the 
unfortunate compromises was that no "accommodation-type" learning 
could realistically be accomplished and therefore was not 
targetted during the training. The figure below shows the course 
content according to the result of the goal and the content 
analysis methods mentioned previously: 
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Main cate-
gories 
Course 
intro-
duction 
etc. 
1st level 
sub-
categories 
Course 
purposes 
Video film 
about man-
machine 
interface 
research 
LIT-4 
project 
information 
Introduc-
tion 
2nd level 
sub-
categories 
Course 
purposes 
stated ex-
plicitly 
Understand-
ing of the 
research area 
in general 
Understand-
ing of main 
purposes and 
methods 
Exemplifica-
tion of criti-
Basic 
elements 
Understanding 
of background 
and details of 
each purpose 
Understanding 
of LIT-4 pro-
ject background 
in general 
Understanding 
of each sub-
goal and 
method 
Understanding 
of respective 
cal situations effects of dis-
turbances 
Diagnostic 
search dis-
turbances 
etc. 
"Human 
errors' 
Stress 
Types and ori- Understanding 
gin of selec- of each error 
ted errors type 
Types and nature Understanding 
of stress of each stress 
type 
Counter-
acting dis-
turbances 
General means Specific means 
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Main cate-
gories 
1st level 
sub-
categories 
2nd level 
sub-
categories 
Basic 
elements 
Introduc-
tion 
Clarification 
of concepts 
and area to be 
dealt with 
during the 
course 
Motivational 
factors con-
cerning each 
concept and 
sub-area in 
which diagnos-
tic search can 
be applied 
Decision-
making and 
diagnostic 
search 
Decision-
making 
Diagnostic 
search 
Decision-
making se-
quence 
Understanding 
of each step 
Diagnostic Understanding 
search sequence of each step 
Behaviour 
types 
Behaviour typo- Respective be-
logy background haviour type 
Synthesis Synthesis back- Understanding 
ground and prin- of each part 
cipies and overall 
picture 
Introduc-
tion 
Clarification of Understanding 
concept area of each concept 
System of 
diagnostic 
rules 
Principles Understanding 
each principle 
Diagnostic 
rules 
Diagnostic 
rules in 
practice 
General situa-
tions 
Specific situa-
tions 
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Diagnostic 
rules 
Diagnostic 
phases 
Diagnostic 
units and 
rules 
Practical 
exercises 
Identification Application of 
of diagnostic units and 
phases rules 
The training methods were dictated by the course content. 
The construction of the diagnostic rules to be used later in the 
diagnostic rule training course was as far as possible carried out 
according to the principles described earlier. Unfortunately, one 
special circumstance made it necessary to make an important 
alteration of the original construction plans. Since specific 
diagnostic rules, especially algorithmic rules, are very similar 
to operation instructions, the utility and AKU requested that only 
rules at general and operational levels should be implemented in 
the diagnostic rule training due to the risk of confusion with 
existing operating instructions. This request was gi-anted of 
course, and the work was altered accordingly. 
During the initial stages of the rule construction, other sources 
than nuclear power station staff were used; for example, aviation 
pilots. Thus, the data collection for the first version of the 
diagnostic rule set was carried out in the following principal 
way: 
General Rules Operational Rules 
Interviews with two crews 
at the research reactor 
DR3 at Risø National 
Laboratories in Denmark 
Interviews with three 
crews at the no.^ PWR 
unit at the Ringhalls 
power station in Swe-
den. 
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Interviews and simulator 
studies at two aviation 
training centres in Denmark 
(Jetair and Sterling Airways) 
in which 11 commercial pilots 
participated. 
Three criteria were applied to the choice of incidents quoted 
during the interviews: 
The interviewed crew member should have been personally and 
actively involved in the disturbance, i.e. he should not have 
acted merely as a spectator or have heard about the incident 
from others. 
The interviewed craw member should have experienced 
uncertainty regarding the cause of or counteracting 
procedure(s) for the disturbance. 
The nature of the disturbance quoted should be fairly 
complicated; i.e., preferably involving the entire diagnostic 
search sequence. 
The crew members, whether nuclear power station staff or pilots, 
were interviewed individually for 1-3 hours. In the interview, 
three main items were covered: nature of disturbance, methods of 
solving the problem and other phenomena (technical and "mental") 
which they experienced as disturbing or as making the problem-
solving process difficult. All interviews r.-ere carried out with 
the same LIT-J» project staff member as interviewer. 
The interviewer's notes from these interviews were analysed, and 
about 60 short sentences were extracted in more or less diagnostic 
form. These were further analysed and finally reduced to 28 re-
formulated diagnostic rules. 
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Close examination of the obtained rules showed that headlines 
which corresponded roughly to the diagnostic search sequence could 
be used. The headlines were re-formulated in everyday language: 
1, Determine and delimit the affected area 
2. Collect and verify information 
3. Put information together to form a picture of what has 
happened 
^. Suggest cause(s) of disturbance 
5. Determine and locate the disturbance 
6. Counteract the disturbance. 
The diagnostic rules were now placed under each headline and 
analysed according the following criteria: 
Verbal form - One single sentence 
- Number of words preferably not exceeding 15 
and certainly not more than 25 words 
- Put in a positive way, i.e. no negations 
- Everyday language 
- Only one suggested action in aach rule 
- No ambiguous concepts 
Methodo-
logical 
- Covering an entire diagnostic search 
sequence 
- Deduction of specific rules possible 
- Possible to explain as part of a diagnostic 
search strategy 
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Others - Possible to "reduce" to a shorter, more 
easily retained sentence 
- If possible, include some type of allite-
ration 
- Pedagogical aspects. 
The first version was drafted and discussed by the previously 
consulted number 4 unit crews at Ringhals, and this resulted in a 
reduction of number of rules to 18. This second version of the 
diagnostic rule set was further discussed with the control room 
crews and, from a pedagogical point of view, with instructors at 
AKU. The main decision resulting from these discussions was to 
exclude six rules concerning more technical aspects of fault 
symptoms which brought the number of rules down to 17. Thus the 
following rules constitute the diagnostic rule set used later in 
the training: 
1. Determine and delimit the affected area. 
1.1. Clarify which system is affected (by alarm or other 
means of disturbance discovery). 
1.2. Put up rough limits to the affected area about which 
information should be gathered. 
2. Collect and verify information. 
2.1. Check and determine the most important variables in the 
affected area. 
2.2. Check and determine the interconnection between these 
variables. 
2.3. Check the correctness of the values of these variables. 
3. Put information together to form a picture of what has 
happened. 
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3.1. Create a mental picture of the affected system(s). 
3.2. Go through the course of events using this mental 
picture. 
3-3- Consider all collected information (including informa-
tion of a kind not expected (unanticipated)). 
4. Suggest cause(s) of disturbance. 
4.1. Suggest cause(s) of disturbance based on the processed 
information. 
4.2. Scrutinize the respective suggestions in a very critical 
way. 
5. Determine and locate the disturbance. 
5.1. Determine the two points before and after which undis-
turbed conditions prevail and then go systematically 
through the systam between these points, either "up-
stream" or "down-stream", in order to find the cause of 
disturbance. 
5.2. Be especially observant about valve positions and pump 
indications in the affected area. 
6. Counteract the disturbance. 
The reason for the absence of rules concerning counteractions is 
that control room instructions cover this part of the diagnostic 
rule sequence very extensively and thoroughly. The training 
management at Ringhals and instructors at AKU therefore suggested 
that no diagnostic rules regarding this part should be included in 
the training due to the afore-mentioned risk of interference with 
these instructions and well established routine crew procedures. 
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Data Collection Procedure 
The data collection was carried out at AKU in Studsvik from 
January to April 1985 during the normal annual retraining of PWR 
crews from Ringhals. Each crew stayed at AKU for one week during 
which, all-in-all, five types of transients were run on the full-
scale PWR simulator. The PWR instructors functioned as observers 
for the data collection which involved three of the five 
transients. The first observed transient concerned a high pressure 
pre- heater drain valve which the crews would be likely to forget 
when resuming full power output after a temporary power reduction. 
This would result in a destroyed valve and a false control room 
panel indication showing the valve to be closed. In reality this 
valve was fully open with subsequent pressure and temperature 
problems. 
In the second observation transient, a turbine blade broke and 
penetrated one of the condensors causing substantial damage and 
leakage in this condensor. Due to the influx of salt water, 
increased conductivity would trigger off conductivity alarms which 
would lead the crews to certain standard procedures. 
The last observation transient was based on the development of 
symptoms which indicated a well-known disturbance (steam generator 
tube rupture) but the cause behind these symptoms was of a 
completely different origin. The counteractions to a tube rupture 
would not improve the disturbed situation but only divert the crew 
members' attention. The real reason was a spuriously opened 
pressurizer spray valve which caused symptoms similar to a tube 
rupture. 
In each transient, criteria for certain critical events were 
defined and used as templates for observation of the crew members' 
performance in the simulator. 
When the crews arrived at AKU, they were reminded of the data 
collection and its procedure by way of written information handed 
out by an instructor. This procedure consisted of the following 
events: 
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Information about the data collection. 
Filling-in of crew member background data form. 
Observation of crew performance during the three transients 
mentioned above. These transients were run in the simulator on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays respectively. 
Crew interviews directly after each transient. 
Completion of a form concerning transient response by crew 
members. 
Completion of a form concerning transient response by the 
involved instructor. 
In order to collect data and opinions about the transients, use of 
diagnostic rules and other aspects of crew background, attitudes 
and performance, a set of forms (with accompanying instructions) 
was constructed to gather both facts and opinions. It was 
important to bear in mind that there were time constraints with 
regard to completion of the forms. In addition they had to be 
similar in form and easy to explain and administrate. Thirdly, 
there was the need to be able to quantify the data in order to 
prepare e.g., frequency tables for statistical estimates and the 
like. 
Briefly, the set of forms consisted of the following: 
Form 1 for direct observation by the instructor of crew 
performance on the simulator. This included time scale, 
steps in the diagnostic search process, etc. 
Form 2 for obtaining crew opinions with regard to the diagnostic 
rules - before their actual application. 
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Form 3 for obtaining crew opinions about working methods, 
coordination, handling of disturbances during the 
simulated transients, comparison between simulator and 
the actual plant, etc. 
Form H for obtaining crew opinions about difficulties in the 
simulated transients, methods for dealing with them, 
which parts of the diagnosis were particularly difficult, 
usefulness of the diagnostic rules, etc. 
Form 5 for obtaining crew opinions about the completion of the 
transient from a technical point of view, how the crew 
functioned together during the transient, diagnostics 
methods, whether training in diagnostic rules had changed 
the way of working, etc. 
Form 6 for obtaining crew opinions about the content of the 
diagnostic rule course, how well the course corresponded 
to expectations, to what extent diagnostic rules are 
needed in control room work and their possible use in the 
future, etc. 
As prolonged periods of observation are exhausting to the 
instructors and could also disturb the retraining as such, special 
parts of the transients were picked out for observation. These 
parts were exactly 20 minutes long each. 
The whole data collection process had been explained during a 
three-day instructors7 course, which included information about 
interview techniques and observation methods etc. The instructors 
observed one crew during their retraining week, and the results 
were analysed during a follow-up instructors' course of one day. 
After each retraining/data collection week, the results were sent 
to the project 3taff to be analysed. 
Analysis Methods 
The data analysis was done by using two basic methods: 
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Chi-square tests concerning possible effects of diagnostic 
rule utilization. The data for this analysis were provided by 
using Likert scale type questions in the above-mentioned 
forms. 
Qualitative analysis of the data provided by Form 1. This 
analysis was based on the identification of patterns of crew 
actions during their treatment of the simulated disturbances. 
When Lhe number of actions permitted statistical testing. Chi-
square tests were carried out as supplements to the pattern 
identification. 
RESULTS 
To sum up: 
The training and data collection involved 59 operators from 14 
crews at the Swedish nuclear power station at Ringhals. Six of 
the crews participated in a diagnostic rule course, lasting 
five hours. The course consisted basically of the explanation 
and application of twelve diagnostic rules. 
Data was subsequently collected during a total of 33 simulator 
runs using the three transients. Each lasted about 20 minutes. 
Two methods of data collection were used; observation of crew 
performance and gathering of crew and instructor opinions 
about various aspects of crew performance. 
It was obvious from the results, both from written and from oral 
crew member comments, that some kind of supplementary operator 
support is highly desirable in disturbed system state situations 
to which no instructions are applicable. As no such operator 
support has been included in the crew members' previous training, 
the basic attitude of the participating experimental group members 
was very positive towards the diagnostic rule course. In 
principle, they considered the diagnostic rule methods to be a 
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valuable and important support in disturbed system conditions. The 
practical circumstances of the LIT-4 project diagnostic rule 
course did not. however, allow for more than five hours' 
diagnostic search training. This is, of course, completely 
inadequate when trying to impart search methods based or. 
heuristics, the nature of which are totally different from 
algorithmic methods. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the 
subsequent data collection on the simulator did not shew any 
substantial differences between the experimental and control 
groups. Thus, the main result should be regarded as the recording 
of positive attitudes by the crew members towards heuristic 
diagnostic rules. It is encouraging that 58 per cent of the crew 
members had the rules in mind, despite the short duration of the 
diagnostic search training. Equally encouraging is the fact that 
95 per cent of these crew members found the diagnostic rules to be 
helpful during the transient treatments. This could be regarded as 
a hint of the potential advantages of a diagnostic rule course of 
longer duration. 
The observation method based on Form 1 could be used routinely in 
simulator training provided that appropriate and sufficient 
training of instructors has been given. Form 1 could of course be 
altered in different ways to suit various practical circumstances, 
but the principle of diagnostic phases should be kept intact. As 
these phases are based on the normative way of approaching 
disturbed system states, data concerning the phases will provide a 
logical and structured analysis of crew performance for the 
subsequent transient de-briefings which, in turn, can eventually 
lead to adjustments/revisions in the diagnostic training. 
The content and presentation of the diagnostic rule course have 
shown that the nature and application of diagnostic rules can 
easily be understood by control room crew members. 
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3.2. STUDY OF HUNAN ERRORS DURING SIMULATOR TRAINING 
Introduction 
At the Technical Research Centre of Finland we have been studying 
problems of process operation for some years. This research has, 
for the most part, been coordinated through the Nordic projects on 
design and operation of complex energy systems. For organizing and 
directing our own work, we have found it necessary to try to 
define a comprehensive research plan or programme which we call 
"Enhancing the Mastery of Work in Process Operation". In this 
approach, human reliability has been considered as one criteria of 
well mastered work, but it has not been evaluated in probabilistic 
terms. 
For conscious developing of process operation, it is necessary to 
understand how the present situation has evolved in a historical 
perspective. Thus, we have made an effort to outline the 
historical phases of power production. This we have made, firstly, 
from the point of view of the development of the technical means 
of mastering different energy conversion processes (which 
themselves have become longer and more complicated). Secondly, we 
have defined the corresponding activities of process operation 
work. Thirdly, we have found it necessary to analyse also the 
phases in development of theories that have been formulated in 
order to consciously connect the development of the pro ess and 
its man-machine interface. As a result of these analyses we are 
defining the area of problems in the automation concept of the 
process operation activities and the corresponding theories that 
would most probably represent the next developmental phase. 
The developmental analysis is concretized through an empirical 
analysis of the power plant operation. We have started this with a 
preanalysis based on selected empirical studies reported in the 
literature. Particularly we have tried to find works in which the 
problems of process operation have been formulated as certain 
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paradoxes or internally conflicting tendencies in the demands of 
this work. 
The Problem of Learning in Work 
One of the paradoxes in operating highly automated processes is 
the problem of learning in work. How is it possible to learn and 
maintain the necessary operating qualifactions if practically all 
possibilities of active control are reduced through highly 
reliable automation. One apparent help in this situation is the 
use of training simulators to create the lacking experience, 
particularly, in very rare and complicated situations. But as e.g. 
Brehmer (1980) and recently Wagenaar and Keren (1985) have pointed 
out, learning of complex relations does not take place 
spontaneously on the basis of experiences. Instead, a concept is 
needed of what should be learned. 
This is not unknown to instructors in complex industrial systems. 
There is a considerable amount of theory that is included in the 
training of operators. Yet, and this is clearly shown, e.g. in 
experiments by Broadbent and Aston (1978), verbal knowledge of the 
process does not seem to enhance the operating skill. Hence, there 
seems to be a fundamental problem of mediating between the world 
of knowing and doing. Knowledge is demanded in the form of 
activity systems, not as "knowing". 
The contradiction in the learning process is reflected in the 
mastery of the central demand of this work, i.e. in diagnostic 
judgement. An empirical way of learning from experience would 
produce a judgement activity of the same spirit From its essence 
it is choosing among given, even though sometimes very 
complicated, action alternatives. The concept of the object is a 
summary of experiences of the object. Activity based on this is 
sufficient for mastering the existing or identified demands and 
assures a reasonable level of reliability. 
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It is incomplete in the sense that it does not have potential for 
development. This is due to the fact that it does not include the 
means to construct action alternatives. These means spring from 
the motives and grounds of the actions. A judgement of this kind 
could be called theoretical in contrast to the empirical 
judgement. This characterization would indicate that a particular 
situation is constructed as a concrete form of the general 
dynamical laws that explain it. To achieve this, common exactly 
formulated concepts are needed. Instead of choosing, the operator 
is in this case mentally constructing the solution. On this basis 
he might be able to define the means he needs and decide whether 
or not there are ready methods to act in the situation. 
It is important to note that theoretical judgement would mean a 
general improvement in the mastery of the work demands. We think 
that it does not only apply in some extreme cases in work, even 
though it might become crucial in such. Thus, we are not talking 
about knowledge-based behaviour in the sense of the level cf 
actual action control. Instead we mean that this kind of 
theoretical mastery is a general trait of activity and 
characterizes its internal structure in every situation 
independent of the actual level of action control. 
Some Results of Operation Problems on Simulated Transients 
As a first step in seeking evidence of the existence of the 
different levels of mastering judgement demands, we performed a 
series of simulator experiments. In them we collected data of 
operator errors and tested the suitability of a certain error 
collection method for simulator training proposed as a part of 
Nordic cooperation (Norros and Sammatti, in press). 
The starting point in trying to derive specific hypotheses for 
this study is the fact that the general level of the operators' 
process knowledge and operating skill is high. Two things shew 
this. The qualifications of the operators are regularly tested by 
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the licensing authorities. Furthermore, from an international 
comparison, the availability in both Loviisa plants is very high. 
On the above basis it would be reasonable to think that possible 
operator errors would occur in carrying out well mastered action 
programmes, i.e. such errors that have been called slips (Norman 
1985). From mrch evidence of the problems in operating complex 
systems it is, however, reasonable to assume that, in a disturbed 
situation, operators also commit errors of intention or mistakes 
as Norman calls them. 
1. Our first hypothesis is that failures of orientation or in 
general knowledge are central in disturbance situations. 
Leaning particularly on the results of Broadbent and Aston 
(1978), the operators' knowledge is demanded in the form of 
activity systems, not knowledge as such. Thus there would 
appear also deficiencies in the high level action planning and 
integration of actions. 
2. Action planning must inevitably be collectively performed 
which requires common explicit conceptual means and methods to 
act as a group. These demands might not be adequately mastered 
and this would become observable in performance deficiencies. 
3. We suppose, furthermore, that these tendencies would become 
stronger the higher the complexity of the task. 
ty. If these problems are tied to the critical demands of this 
work, they should differentiate between crews of different 
levels of mastery. 
In the study, operators performed two different simulated 
disturbances (experiment I and II) and defined afterwards, during 
discussions with the instructor, the nature of the possible 
failures in their performance. A failure was thus a deviation from 
an optimal action sequence developed by the instructor. The 
classifications were made in terms of the failing decision 
function and the cause of the error following a method developed 
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at Risø by Hollnagel and Rasmussen (1981). When we, next, briefly 
show some of the results of these experiments, it is to note that 
the method does not include an evaluation of the consequences of 
the committed errors. Thus, the scope is rather the failure 
mechanisms themselves than the effects of the failures. The method 
also reveals all errors; i.e. it does not take into account that 
the crew might have corrected them in a real situation. 
Results 
In the analysis of our results, the following steps are taken: 
First the total distributions of the errors of both experiments 
are presented. Then, a comparison between experiment I and II 
regarding the error distribution is made. Task complexity is the 
interesting independent variable in this comparison. 
In the second step, the occurrence of errors in the action 
sequence and characteristic differences among the crews' error 
profiles are analyzed. 
In the third step the groups of low and high error crews are 
collected and their error distributions compared. Also the 
consistency of the crews' performance in the two experiments is 
analyzed. 
In experiment I (lea'< in the live steam manifold), 57 errors were 
identified. As in some cases more than one classification seemed 
necessary and because no identification of their priority was 
made, a total number of 73 classifications was tested in the 
analysis. The number of errors per crew varied from 3 to 9. In 
experiment II (break of the primary manifold of the steam 
generator), 155 errors were identified varying from 9 to 19 per 
crew. 
The error distributions classified by failing decision function 
and error type are given in Appendices 1 and 2. The distribution 
of errors along the decision function was first analyzed. In both 
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experiments, the majority of errors concentrated on the decision 
and execution functions. In the first experiment the corresponding 
percentages were 31.% and 48% and in the second, 40.6% and 36.8%. 
The distributions were not statistically different. 
Then the distributions along error causes were analyzed using 
broader error categories (see Appendices 1 and 2). The comparison 
between the distributions of the two experiments is shown in 
table 1. 
Our results show that deficiencies in process and system knowledge 
are an important failure cause in disturbance situations. As can 
be read in table 1, the proportion of these failures grows with 
the complexity of the disturbance (experiment I transient is more 
straightforward and physically transparent than experiment II 
transient). 
The second important result shown in the table is that in a 
complex situation, deficiencies in communication and cooperation 
cause proportionally more failures. The growth is small and its 
significance has to be studied further. 
The proportion of procedure related failures is high in the first 
experiment and strongly reduced in the second experiment. Also 
this result needs further explanation. It is also important to 
note that the "simulator effect" is approximately 10% in these 
experiments. 
In the second step of the data analysis we tried to gain closer 
contextural knowledge of the failures than the distributions could 
give. Thus it was studied where in the expected action sequence 
the errors occurred. These data are given for both experiments in 
Appendices 3 and 4. 
Two things can be found out from these charts. First, there are 
certain phases of the transient in which errors seem to be 
concentrated. 
73 
Table 1. Comparison of the error distributions of experiment I and 
II regarding the error cause categories. Distributions differ 
significantly (p < 0.01). 
Error Categories Experiment I Experiment II 
n * n t 
1. Control room layout 4 5.5 5 3.2 
2. Procedures 22 30.1 21 17.4 
3. Cooperation 10 13-7 25 16.2 
4. Knowledge and action 
control 25 3^ -3 86 55.5 
5. Action disturbance 4 5.5 0 0 
6. Simulator effect 8 11.0 12 7/7 
J2 100.0 155 100.0 
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As an example in experiment II, which was a LOCA-transient, a 
concentration of errors could be found as shown in Appendix 1. In 
the stabilization phase, particularly after initiating an 
additional failure, many errors were committed. Critical tasks in 
this part of the sequence were decreasing of the primary pressure 
and simultaneously maintaining the boiling margin. As the table 
indicates, there were many errors in this part of the phase. 
For example, step 17 can be considered as the key action in 
attempting to reduce primary pressure. Seven errors were committed 
there. The causes of not adequately starting the use of normal 
makeup water system were communication and strategic (E, G, I) 
and, in other cases, problems of procedure and knowledge 
deficiencies (H, K). 
The frequency of errors in step 18 was even higher. This step can 
also be considered important in reducing primary pressure. Crews 
A, B and L performed the required measures but they were delayed. 
Crews C, D, E and G omitted the measures eventually because they 
were not included in the procedure. The procedures that were valid 
at the time of the experiment were rather general including only 
12 steps. 
The steps 23-26 are the last of the stabilization phase. As to its 
physical nature, it is perhaps the most complicated phase in the 
"lide transient. The main goal here is to hold the boiling margin, 
i.e. the pressure and temperature should be lowered in 
synchronization as to avoid boiling of the water. In this phase, 
the so-called TMI-phenomenon appeared. In it, the pressurizer 
fills up with water because of heavy evaporation of water in the 
reactor and formation of a steam bubble. This phenomenon caused 
problems, which are reflected by the errors in steps 23-26. All 
but one crew (L) committed errors in these four steps. Their 
causes are distributed in the following manner: action control (11 
= 50%, particularly delays and lack of supervision), cooperation 
(7 = 31.8%, particularly lack of common strategy), procedures (3 = 
13-6%) and layout (1 = 1.6%). Thus, we notice a high rate of 
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action control deficiences and a rise in the rate of cooperative 
problems in this difficult and critical point of the transient. 
The second important observation in this analytical step was that 
there are clear differences between the error profiles of the 
crews. As a starting point, we analyzed the crews' performance in 
the initial diagnostic phase of the transient of experiment I. 
There appear typical differencies on the way the crews judge the 
situation and their needs. These differences can be used as a 
basis for grouping the crews into three types. 
The first group was identified as the one having problems in 
diagnosing the situation (see Appendix 3). This was the case in 
three crews (E, F, G). These crews were using instructions but, at 
least in the beginning, there occurred problems in their 
selection. 
The second group comprised those crews which made a right 
diagnosis and also used instructions (A, B, C, D). 
There was also the case in which the crew during the second, 
initial diagnosis phase of the transient made the decision not to 
use instructions. This crew (H) was considered as a third group. 
It was typical for the first group of the crews that diagnostic 
problems occurred also in the later phase of the transient as 
Appendix 3 shows. Characteristic for these crews were also errors 
caused by deficiencies in procedures. The second group of crews 
had some problems related to deficiencies in knowledge of the 
processes and systems. Even though they also used instructions, 
there were almost no errors caused by deficiencies in them. The 
third group of crews was represented by only one crew, H. As 
mentioned, typical of this crew was the conscious neglect of the 
instructions. 
The performance of the second crew was better than the other two 
groups according to the overall error rate. 
76 
In the case of experiment II, the success in the initial 
diagnostic activity did not predict later success in the 
performance. This might be due to the nature of the transient. 
Instead, we took the third step in the analysis and split the 
crews of the second experiment in two groups according to their 
performance measured through weighted error rate. The result of 
comparison between the low and high error crews according to the 
error cause is presented in Table 2. 
Interesting in this comparison is that the procedure-caused errors 
and cooperation errors are proportionally higher for the high 
error crews. This causes eventually the significant difference 
between the distributions. 
Finally, it is interesting to see how those crews that succeeded 
well in the first transient would do in the second one, and how 
those who were less successful in the first would manage in the 
second. A consistency in the crews' placement in the two groups 
(low and high error) would be needed for formulation of a 
hypothesis that there were some habitual factors that would ex-
plain the differences in the crews' performance. A comparison of 
the crews* placement into the different groups is given in 
Table 3. 
Conclusions 
Our data and the instructor's notes during the experiments show 
that the deficiencies in process and system knowledge are 
important failure causes in disturbance situations. The proportion 
of these failures grow with the complexity of the disturbance. 
Moreover, the crews seemed to have difficulties to formulate a 
common strategic plan of managing the situation which would have 
helped to coordinate their activity. 
The crews have tools to use in disturbance and emergency 
situations. However, our results shows that objective deficiencies 
in procedures cause failure in handling the situation. There are 
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Table 2. Comparison of the error distributions of the low error 
and high error groups in experiment II regarding the error 
categories (p < 0.05) (low error = 5 crews, high error = 7 
crews). 
Error Category Low Error High Error 
n % 
1 . Control room layout 4.0 
2. Procedures 9. 1 22 22.0 
3. Cooperation 9.1 20 20.0 
4. Knowledge and action 
control 37 67.3 49 49.0 
5. Action disturbance 
6. Simulator effect 12.7 5.0 
55 100.0 100 100.0 
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Table 3. Crews' placement in low and high error groups in 
experiment I and II (crews J, L, I, K were included only in 
experiment II). 
Experiment I Experiment II 
Low error A A J 
B B L 
C C 
D 
High error D I 
E E K 
F F 
G G 
H H 
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more typical for those crews who, according to the overall failure 
rate, seem to perform less optimally, as is shown in Table 2. The 
table also shows that the high error crews have a higher rate of 
cooperation errors. This reflects problems in forming and 
communicating a common strategic plan, which could be considered 
the crucial tool in the more complex situation. The cooperation 
problems were for all crews most frequent in the critical and 
difficult phases of the transient. Hence, there are indications of 
knowledge deficiencies although the operators are well qualified. 
There are communicational lacks tied with cooperation problems 
although the crews have worked together a long time. Means that 
the operators have are not adequately mastered and problems arise 
in creating new collective means, strategic plans. Problems arise 
for the same crews and they are in general more frequent in a more 
complex situation. 
Our hypothesis is that all the potentials in the empirical 
judgement have been used and there is a need for a qualitatively 
higher level for mastering the demands. Unfortunately, the data do 
not allow us to test this hypothesis. The method itself finds its 
limits here: no contextual data of the thinking processes or 
orientation basis of the operators were collected. Moreover, the 
scope of analysis is incomplete. In terms of A. N. Leontjev's 
hierarchization of activity (1979), the method considers process 
operation merely on the action level, e.g. as fulfilling tasks or 
solving problems. It excludes the level of activity which is 
defined through the motives of actions and is needed for deriving 
the actions. Thus, it is impossible to investigate to what extent 
motives and the grounds of actions have become conscious and 
actual determining factors of operators' performance control. 
The next step we found necessary was a training intervention study 
in which an in-depth analysis of the diagnostic activity was 
carried out. This we realized in the form of a case study with one 
crew. In this we aimed, first, to acquire knowledge of the 
operators' actual models of the process. This was realized through 
training sessions which included modelling tasks as test tasks. 
Secondly, through analyzing the crews' video taped performances in 
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three disturbances, we acquired data of actual performance. 
Thirdly, by allowing the operators to comment about their own 
performance, we could get data of the explanative or reflective 
side of the activity. Through analyzing these levels of knowing, 
doing and explaining and through contrasting them with each other, 
we think we will be able to identify contradictions and 
deficiencies which form barriers in activity. These should be 
removed. These data are presently under analysis. 
Nature of Human Reliability in the Light of the Results 
According to our approach, developmental analysis is a necessary 
means to reveal the essential nature of the research object. This 
applies also to the problem of reliability. Human reliability is 
presently conceptualized as "component reliability", which can be 
defined as the probability of performing the demanded task in a 
given time. Behind the concept, there is an interpretation of 
operation work as fulfilling given tasks. This is, however, not 
the essential nature of the work in complex systems. In terms of 
differentiating between empirical and theoretical judgement, it 
could be suggested that the prevailing reliability concept 
captures the empirical but not the theoretical judgement activity. 
There would thus be a need to analyze the concepts of reliability 
and risk in their relation to the developing technology and test 
their validity in complex man-machine systems. 
In our psychological analysis, we define human reliability through 
"parameters" that characterize the mastery of work. The three main 
parameters are thinking, motivation and cooperation. Enhancing 
reliability in work would mean a simultaneous improvement in all 
of them. Our starting point is that high reliability prerequires 
mastery that exceeds the normally sufficient level, i.e. the 
operators should be qualified to principally produce the 
algorithmic or automated performance that is normally required. 
This is closely related to motivation and responsibility. If the 
objective cognitive scope of work is split into acts and tasks, 
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there are no prerequisites for developing a sense of 
responsibility over the production as a whole. 
The reliability of actions is dependent of the way they have been 
learned. If rules and routines are acquired in ready form and 
given, their applicability cannot be questioned during later use. 
In case of possible errors, the recovery is more probable if the 
operators possess means to reflect upon their own activity. 
Conscious creation of activity structures develop these means. 
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Al'PENDIX 1. Distribution of errors in experiment l 
Decision function obs dia dec exe fb n \ 
Hrror categories 
1. Control room lay out 1 1 
11 separated displays and controls 
12 unclear lay out of panels 
IS displays difficult to understand 
14 information missing 3 3 
4 4 5.5 
2. Procedures 
21 error in procedures 
22 deficiencies in procedures 
23 contradictions in procedures 
24 procedures not used 
13 9 22 30.1 
3. Coopera t i on 
31 insufficient concentration 
32 insufficient communicati on 3 2 1 6 8.2 
33 unclear division of tasks 
34 lack of operational strategy 
4. Knowledge and action control 
41 insufficient process knowledge 1 5 3 'J 12.3 
42 inaccurate diagnosis 1 
43 incorrect action 
44 omission 1 8 9 12.3 
45 delay in decision or action 
3 3 5 14 25 34.3 
"i. Ac t i on d i s t urbances 
51 external disturbance 2 1 3 
52 stress 
53 operator incapacitated 1 1 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
•> 
1 
 
3 
10 
 
5 
 
•> 
3 1 4 5.5 
6. Simulator effect 
61 differences btw. cr and simulator 5 1 6 
62 attitude towards simulator 2 2 
7 1 8 11.0 
7 6 23 35 2 73 100 
9.6 8.2 31.5 48.0 2.7 100 
lobs = observation, dia = diagnosis, dec = docision, exe = execution, 
fo -• feedback) 
APPtMMX 2. Distritiut ion of errors in experiment II 
Incision function obs dia <ieo exe fb n 
Error categories 
1. Control room lay oui 
11 separated displays and controls I I 2 
12 unclear lay out of panels 1 1 2 
13 displays difficult to understand 
14 information missing 1 1 
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5. Action disturbances 
51 external disturbance 
52 stress 
53 operator incapacitated 
6. Simulator effect 
61 differences btw. cr and simulator 
62 attitudes towards simulator 
2 1 2 5 3.2 
2. Procedures 
21 error in procedures 
22 deficiencies in procedures 2 1 5 'J 
23 contradictions in procedures 1 1 
24 procedures not used 6 2 
2 1 12 12 
3. Coopera t i on 
31 insufficient concentration 1 
32 insufficient conmunication 7 4 
33 unclear division of tasks 
34 lack of operational strategy 1! 
IH A 
4. Knowledge and action control 
41 insufficient process knowledge 3 I II fi 2 23 14.9 
42 deficiencies in processing inf. 3 1 1 5 
43 inaccurate diagnosis 6 1 7 
44 incorrect action 
45 omission 4 12 
46 delay in decision or action 14 fi 
47 significance not understood 1 1 1 
48 lack of supervision 6 
7 8 32 30 
2 
2 
17 
2 
8 
27 
3 
11 
11 
25 
11.0 
5.2 
17.4 
7.1 
7.1 
16.2 
20 
20 
3 
8 
86 
12.9 
12.9 
5.2 
55.5 
2 
2 
13 9 
8.4 5.8 
6 
4 
10 
63 57 
40.6 36.8 
13 
8.4 
8 
4 
12 
155 
100 
7.7 
100 
iobs = observation, dia = diagnosis, dec = decision, exe = execution, 
ft - feedback) 
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UTl-^ iDlX 3. Occurrence of errors in action sequence in experiment 
Crews 
A B C D E F G H A Li C D h 
V? t i on 
;equence 
1 41 
2 42 
:. 43 
4 44 
Symptoms 
5 45 
6 46 
7 1 11 47 1 1 1 1 
8 48 
9 49 
nitial 10 111 11 50 
liag- 11 1 51 
losis _1_2 1 11 52 
13 53 
14 54 
Uabil- 15 55 
sat ion 16 56 Diagnosis 
17 57 ver ifi-
18 58 ration 
19 59 1! 11 
20 1 11 1 1 60 11 
21 11 1 61 1 1 1 1 1_ 1 1 1 
22 1 62 11 l" \ 1 ~"'l Reeov-
23 1 1 63 1 erv 
24 64 
25 65 
26 66 1 
27 67 
28 1 1 1 68 
29 111 1 69 11 1 11 
30 70 
31 1 1 71 
32 72 
33 73 
34 1 74 
35 75 
36 76 
37 77 
38 1 11 78 
39 79 
40 80 
200 1 
._. 201 1 
Errors 5 8 ~ 6 3 8 9 9 9 n=57 
Classifications 7 10 8 3 11 10 11 13 n=73 
APPENDIX 4. Occurrence of errors in action sequence in experiment II 
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Crews 
Ac t i on 
sequence 
Svmpt oms 
1 
2~ 
L'iag- 3 
nos i s 4 
5 
S tab i 1- 6 
i zat i on 7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
Add i - 14 
t iona 1 1 5 
dis- 16 
turb- 17 
a n c e s 18 
19 
2 0 
2 1 
0
 2 
23 
24 
25 
2 6 
Ftccox'- 2 7 
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3.3 STUDY OF DIAGNOSTIC RULES BT INTERVIEWING OPERATORS 
Introduction 
Studies at the Halden Boiling Water Reactor and the Loviisa 2 
Nuclear Power Plant were conducted as part of the OECD Halden 
Reactor Project's joint programme including the Nordic LIT4 
effort. The overall purpose was the development of methods for 
operator training and the collection of human malfunctioning 
during simulator training sessions. 
The basic aim of the work was an investigation of the diagnostic 
methods used by experienced control room personnel in order to 
develop a set of diagnostic rules which could aid operators in the 
diagnosis of transients. Work along these lines has been in 
progress for a number of years (Duncan and Shepherd (1975). 
Marshall et al (1981)). Although such work has been chiefly 
confined to the petrochemical industry, for the purpose of this 
exercise, the situation in nuclear power plants was deemed 
sufficiently similar to warrant its application here. For example, 
both endeavors require serious attention to overall goals relating 
to safety and production and both have processes of comparable 
levels of complexity which are remotely controlled from central 
control rooms with similar instrumentation. 
In addition to considering the diagnostic methods used, Loviisa 
operators were also asked about what amendments and/or 
improvements they would like to see in the control room to help 
them in diagnosis. 
Lastly, the results of the study have had an effect on portions of 
the training program implemented at Halden in connection with the 
experimental programme utilizing the on-site NORS full-scale 
simulator. 
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Diagnostic Rule Generation at the HBWR 
The main objectives of this study were: 
to elicit "rules of thumb" from the operators, either 
individually or in groups, using a so-called Fault Symptom 
Matrix generated by the senior reactor engineer at the plant. 
to test these rules against the Matrix and modify them 
accordingly. 
- to interview operators and try f.c enlarge the Matrix with 
additional faults suggested by the operators themselves. 
to use the resulting information as a basis for constructing a 
short training programme on diagnosis. 
As stated, the approach has been used successfully in the 
petrochemical industry. While the two application areas are not 
identical - e.g., the nuclear solution is based to a greater 
degree on formal, written procedures - it was still seen as a 
useful aid, especially in the early states of a transient where a 
number of simultaneous things can occur which often lead to 
erroneous fir3t diagnoses based on misleading or inadequate 
information. Thus the objective of the approach is the development 
of versatility in diagnosis so that operators can learn to utilize 
strategies and rules which will allow them to cope with new and 
unexpected situations not previously encountered during operation 
or training. 
A Fault Symptom Matrix is an array of information relating given 
faults with corresponding symptoms (indications, meter readings, 
etc.). Fig.7 illustrates such a matrix. Before any discussions 
were started with the operators, a tentative matrix was 
constructed in cooperation with the senior staff. The set of 
faults included was of course not exhaustive, but it contained 
especially important, difficult and/or critical situations which 
actually had occurred or were feasible. Special thought had also 
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to be given to those faults where the symptom sets were too 
similar or inconclusive. 
The matrix was then used to stimulate an initial discussion with 
two Halden reactor operators with an eye toward eliciting a number 
of "rules of thumb" representing the way these operators would go 
about diagnosing problems in the control room. The questions 
listed in checklists 1 and 2 were used in conjunction with the 
Fault Symptom Matrix to assist in the elicitation. 
The first draft of rules consisted of the following: 
Look at alarms 
Confirm alarms 
Check appropriate instrument(s) 
Check control loops 
Suspect the instrumentation 
A second meeting with two other operators was held to obtain 
answers to questions which arose after the first meeting and also 
to expand the circle of interviewed operators and thus obtain a 
better consensus - i.e., an optimum distillation of available 
expertise and experience. Specific system-relevant details were 
discussed. In addition, experience was stated to be the major 
prerequisite for being able to evaluate the "gravity" of a 
disturbance and for anticipating many of the fault situations 
before they resulted in the triggering of alarms. However, they 
considered the following set of rules to be applicable: 
- Look at alarms (general, loop, heat removal...) 
- Confirm alarms 
- Check appropriate instruments (depending on the alarms) 
- Check relevant control loops including 
pumps flows, levels 
valves open/closed 
Checklist 1 
THE FAULT SYMPTOM MATRIX 
1. The first step in constructing a Fault Symptom 
' itrix is to select a set of faults or incidents 
which operators need to be able to cope with. This will not 
be a complete listing of everything which could go 
wrong, but should contain a number of incidents which are 
thought to be especially important or difficult to deal with. 
2. For each of the faults or incidents chosen above, a 
list is made of relevant instrument readings and 
indications. This can include information not directly 
available in the control room. 
3. This information is then drawn up as a matrix: 
Fault/Incident Indications 
*. Readings included in the matrix can be det-
ailed, eg. specific temperatures or pressures, or more 
general eg. high, low, etc. whichever is thought to be 
adequate. 
Should the case arise in which two faults give similar 
indications, additional time should be spent on finding a 
means of differentiating them. 
5. Operators are then given the list of selected 
indicators (without the readings) and told "Something has 
gone wrong. What information would you look for?" Readings 
can then be given to the operaters as they request them and a 
careful note is made of the order in which the information is 
requested. In this way. a step-by-step description c»n be 
obtained of the way in which operators work toward a 
diagnosis. 
Operators will differ in their strategy, and, at this 
stage, discussions are held to determine the "best" or 
generally agreed course. The aim is to arrive at a number of 
"rules of thumb* which can be applied in dealing with any 
incident. 
6. Once a generally agreed set of rules is arrived at, 
they can then be tried out on more incidents to determine 
whether they work and modified accordingly. 
Checklist 2 
0UEST10NS TO OPERATORS 
(To be used in conjunction with the Fault Symptom Matrix.) 
1. Would there be any other alarms with these faults? 
Z. Are there any other indications you would want to add 
to this set for each of the faults? 
3. Would the alarms be the first thing you would notice? 
4. Presumably, when you get an alarm, it could indicate 
a number of possible faults. What is the first thing 
you would check/do? 
5. Put another way, what is your first priority when you 
get an alarm? 
6. What other faults/incidents do you think it would be 
useful for a new operator to know? Could we have a 
Fault Symptom Matrix for these? 
7. Can you think of any faults or incidents which are 
very difficult to separate from each other because 
the indications they give are so similar? 
If ye s: -
What are they? 
What are the indications? 
How would you separate them? (ie. What 
additional information would you look for to distinguish 
between them?) 
8. How useful are the alarms? Would it help to have some 
kind of filtering system for alarms especially during 
scheduled actions like start-up where you have a lot of 
alarms just as a result of this particular procedure? 
9. Are there things you would do before trying to make a 
diagnosis such as ensuring that certain parameters were 
within limits. 
0. How are tasks divided in the control room; 
a) in normal operation 
b) in tt\e event of an incident? 
Note: These are questions which seemed useful and relevant 
to ask the operators at Halden. They would, of course need 
to be modified in other situations. 
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pressures 
temperatures 
- BEGIN to suspect the instrumentation 
The formulation of the last rule differs a bit from the first 
version in that it attempts to counteract the tendency to begin by 
regarding any disturbance as a probable instrument failure. 
In addition, several more general operating strategies were 
elicited which provided a broader guidance for work in the control 
room. These were: 
Never assume at the start that the problem is due to an 
instrument failure. 
Always take alarms seriously 
Any leakage alarm is serious 
Any increase in concentration on gas monitors is serious 
If unsure at any state, ask for hplp 
The study at Halden was felt to be a useful exercise and provided 
a good basis for the following work. Generalisations of course can 
be difficult to make - some of the above items are quite plant-
specific. However, the method seems to be feasible in nuclear 
power plant applications and a rule generation exercise is planned 
as part of the diagnostic training program for the NORS simulator. 
See this section. 
Study at the Loviisa 2 Plant 
This study was conducted in the form of an interview with an 
experience shift supervisor in order to elicit his opinions on 
process fault diagnosis in (existing) control rooms with regard to 
instrumentation, information presentation, etc. together with 
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suggestions for modifications, improvements. More detailed 
objectives were: 
(1) Conduct a "structured" interview with an experienced 
staff member with a view to eliciting information on the 
problems involved in running a plant under both normal 
and abnormal conditions. 
(2) Discuss the role of operating procedures. 
(3) Consider the use of instrumentation in the control, 
especially with regard to the presentation of information 
to the operators. 
(4) Note any suggestions for improvement in any of the above 
based on practical operating experience. 
(5) Elicit suggestions which might be incorporated into a 
training programme for operators, such as that for the 
NORS simulator at Halden. 
Regarding (1) and diagnosis, the location of a leak was used as an 
example. A number of important steps must be gone through: 
STEPS IN LOCATING A POSSIBLE LEAKAGE 
1. WHERE is it? Primary or Secondary 
Inside Containment or Outside 
(If inside, the moisture 
content will rise together 
a change in underpressure) 
ACTION Try to shut down or isolate 
2. How BIG is it? Pressure level goes down 
(with only one feedwater 
pump as is normal) 
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As level goes down, other 
pumps come in. 
Is the level rising or still 
falling? This should give an 
indication of the size of the 
leak and how much time is 
available to deal with it. 
3. Get warm water in How big are the pumps? 
What are they capable of? 
(There may be sufficient water 
but it may not be possible to 
pump it efficiently under 
abnormal conditions) 
Regarding the type of information presentation best suited for 
specific purposes, the opinion was that there was at present too 
much information on the VDU's and that it would better to have 
"pre-processed" information. Indeed the diagnostic rules at 
Loviisa were felt to be of the type which assisted operators in 
breaking down the vast array of information into a form which is 
both comprehensible and easy to utilize - often under difficult 
circumstances. 
In addition, it was felt that the computer could be used to direct 
the operator to approprate information and instruments which he 
then could verify. It was critically important that the main plant 
parameters were displayed prominently. Information retrieval was 
seen as a problem - e.g., if pumps are started from one location 
but have to be controlled from another panel - conflicts also can 
arise between using the VDU displays and the dedicated 
instrumentation and indicators. 
The need for overview displays in the form of a mimic of the 
process diagram on a VDU was expressed. The operator could 
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interact directly with the diagram via a light pen or touch panel 
and thus receive feedback from the computer to indicate that the 
appropriate actions had been taken and the proper responses made 
by the system. Overall status could be gotten at any given time. 
It was felt that such an approach would facilitate transfer of 
operators from one plant to another of the same type. 
The computer could also be used in a more comprehensive way to 
support the operator. Examples mentioned were concerned with 
displaying safety system status as well as interlock and 
protection system status during startup, etc. In addition, the 
whole area cf computerized operating procedures would appear to be 
a relevant area to study. 
Dependence on computers and their reliability was not seen as a 
special problem. The suggestion was made that, if there were no 
expenditures made on conventional panels, it would be possible to 
invest in more computer back-up. The (un)reliability of 
conventional kncbs and switches was also pointed out. However, 
there is a potential disadvantage in forcing operators to sit for 
long periods of time looking at VDU. This could be overcome to 
some extent by having a small number of selected wall-mounted 
instruments displaying the main parameters; these would permit the 
operators to move about the control room while keeping in touch 
with the overall status. They could then return to the VDU for 
control purposes and the retrieval of additional information. A 
consideration of shorter shift periods could also be made. 
There was expressed enthusiastic support for colour displays, 
since, for example, this would allow the main process parameters 
to be colour-coded, thus increasing their visibility. 
The use of full-scope simulators was supported seen from the point 
of view of being able to replicate incidents from the station 
control room and hold "post morterns" on the actions actually taken 
so that assessments could be made and alternate solutions 
evaluated. 
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Operator Training and Simulator Fidelity 
An important element in a training programme is the use of 
simulation. A major concern is the selection of one or more levels 
of simulation fidelity appropriate to different aspects of the 
training. See also Baker and Marshall (1983) and Rouse (1982, 
1985) for further discussions of this point. 
Since this report deals with training for diagnostic skills, a few 
remarks will be made relating fidelity to training for unusual 
events. As an argument for utilizing full-scale simulators, it is 
stated that gaining experience with unusual process events on a 
simulator will improve operator performance when faced with a real 
event. It may be possible to demonstrate that this is true when 
previously practised events do actually occur in the control room. 
However, the object of training should be to prepare the operators 
for events which have not been foreseen and thus not experienced 
in training situations c.i a simulator. To be able to be versatile 
in coping with such disturbances, the operators need general 
strategies which often involve collation and interpretation of a 
large array of information. Although such skills can be (and 
probably have to be) tested using full-scale simulators, there is 
little to be gained in teaching them in such an environment. 
Thus much can be said for adopting a mixed-fidelity approach to 
training - i.e. an amalgamation of a number of instructional 
techniques which utilize simulation on at least three different 
fidelity levels - low, medium and high. Low fidelity simulation 
can be employed to teach basic skills, principles and concepts. A 
more intermediate level can be used for applying these basic 
skills to the type of equipment being simulated while the final 
full-scale simulator can provide practise on almost the "real 
thing" and, at the same time, provide a test bed for performance 
evaluation. 
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NORS Training Prograa 
The development of the NORS facility at Halden, with its demands 
for a team of skilled operators has highlighted the importance of 
training in the Halden research programme. Considerable efforts 
have been devoted to the construction of a documented, modular 
training programme which emphasizes self-instruction combined with 
close monitoring of each student's progress. The programme was 
specifically devised to introduce volunteer operators to the NORS 
process in preparation for their participation in various 
experimental and evaluational projects. Interest in the 
development and testing of computerized operator support systems 
necessarily involves the training of operators to cope with 
infrequent events with the help of new and advanced information 
display systems. 
There are a number of general requirements which had to be 
fulfilled by the training programme. For example, 
the programme had to be designed so that it was consistent 
among the various trainees - i.e., it is important that all 
subjects taking part in the experiments have been exposed to 
the same training information and have achieved some common 
level of competence. In particular, it is important that the 
material is robust and remains effective over time and with 
change in instructors. 
the programme had to be tailored to fit into the constraints 
of a restricted time schedule - which may vary from occasion 
to occasion. This means that the programme must be flexible 
and usually highly concentrated and specifically tailored to 
the experimental goals and requirements. 
the programme had to take into account the number of trainees 
available, the crew size, etc. This is important in selecting 
appropriate audio-visual aids, simulator time, etc. 
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A typical set of training objectives, in this case used in 
conjunction with experiments with alarm systems, aimed at training 
the operators to be able to: 
understand the process 
monitor the plant during normal operation 
manage a load change 
run the plant successfully with partial shutdown 
manage a scram 
recognize transients from disturbed plant conditions 
take the first steps in appropriate remedial actions 
understand the functioning of the automatic protection system 
use the available alarm systems. 
The main guiding principle underlying the training programme was 
that it should be both systematic, well-structured and adequately 
programmed - taking into account the limited time available, yet 
ensuring that all trainees received the same information 
Programmed instruction aims at enhancing learning by actively 
involving the student and by organizing the materials and training 
sessions and incorporating "steps" in the instruction which are 
gradual and yet steep enough to involve some effort. This point is 
especially important when experienced operators are the trainees. 
Extreme care must be taken to design the training so that, at 
every stage, the trainee has to think about what he has been 
taught and apply any newly acquired knowledge in meaningful 
exercises. Therefore the training was broken down in short periods 
of concentrated instruction followed by appropriate exercises, 
simulator practise and discussion so that eventual problems could 
be clarified. 
Considerable reliance was placed on "self-tutoring" and "learning 
by doing" since, because of the limited time available, it was 
essential that the trainees could acquire as much practical 
experience with the NORS simulator as possible. 
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Actually from providing the trainees with an introduction to the 
simulator, there was a considerable interest in encouraging the 
trainees to assist in the construction of the programme itself-
1>ainees were urged to generate their own training material and 
make suggestions for amendments and improvements. 
The main course modules and timetables for the particular training 
programme under discussion were the following: 
MAIN COURSE MODULES DAYS 
- Introduction and familiarisation 3 
- Detailed plant geography 5 
- Process operations and 
transient management 3 
- Process fault finding 3 
- Familiarisation with alarm system \ 
Total 15 
More information on these modules can be found in Baker & Marshall 
(1985a,b). However it is relevant in the present context to 
describe in more detail the three day course on PROCESS FAULT 
FINDING. 
Training Module on Process Fault Finding 
The objective of this module was that operators should become 
capable of diagnosing plant failures with a reasonable degree of 
versatility. Since the particular experiment was an evaluation of 
an alarm handling system, particular attention was focussed on the 
use of alarms as an aid to diagnosis. The instruction in fault-
finding contained both static and dynamic exercises as described 
later. 
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A powerful technique for teaching the interrelationships between 
different process systems and thereby also practising the crucial 
elements of fault-finding is to use symptom generation and/or 
prediction exercises. This involves asking operators to describe 
the symptoms they would expect to see in the case of specific 
plant disturbances. This is, of course, the reverse of the 
situation in the control room where the operator is confronted 
with an array of symptoms and is expected to deduce the cause of 
the disturbance. Nevertheless the generation/prediciion approach 
has been shown to be a valuable means for assessing and 
externalising the way in which operators (and trainees} develop an 
understanding of the complex relationships between the process and 
the associated indications (See Marshall et al (1981)). 
Two sets of practise faults, each including seven faults, were 
generated together with associated plant indications. Each crew 
was assigned one fault from the first set and asked to predict 
which alarms they would expect to see as a result of this fault 
and whether a scram or turbine trip would occur. Each crew 
explained its solution for the other crews and, after further 
discussions, appropriate revisions were made. The transient was 
then run on the simulator and a corresponding alarm list 
generated. Each crew compared its own list with the simulator 
output and produced a new list which, in its view, represented the 
most important and relevant alarms for the particular fault. 
Overhead projector slides were then prepared of these predicted 
symptom lists. 
These slides were used to test trainee operators' fault-finding 
ability through a series of so-called static diagnostic tests. 
Each slide was shown for 30 seconds during which time, the 
displayed problem had to be identified. At the start, as an aid, 
they were given a list of possible faults from the original sets. 
These tests are called static because the array of symptoms is 
fixed and does not change with time as would be the case in the 
control room or on the simulator. As such, the static symptoms 
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represent a kind of alarm "signature" for the particular 
transient. 
Initially two static tests each with ten transients were run. 
After the second test, the syuptorn generation procedure was 
repeated for the second set of seven faults. Subsequently two 
additional static tests coabined faults from the two original sets 
(14 in all) and were interspersed with remedial practise sessions. 
The average results across the fourteen trainees are summarized in 
the following table: 
RESULTS OF STATIC DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test * 
Set A Set A Set A Set B Set A Set B 
For all 
trainees 83% 99* 99* 3»»* 99* 90* 
These static exercises thus served the purpose of focussing the 
trainees' attention on the alarm displays. They were followed by 
dynamic exercises on the simulator. Each crew took a turn at the 
simulator and a transient was initiated. The c*ew then attempted 
to diagnose the problem and take whatever remedial action was 
necessary. There was no formal scoring - although all crews made 
successful diagnoses. No interference was allowed from the other 
trainees; however there was a discussion afterwards. In order to 
have a set of unseen transients for the subsequent experiment, 
twenty transient scenarios were prepared. Eight were used as 
practise transients during the dynamic exercises. 
There turned out to be delay between the original training course 
and the start of the experiments. Therefore, it was felt necessary 
that the volunteer crews attended an extended period of re-
training prior to the experiments. This refresher course consisted 
of both classroom exercises and hands-on simulator practise. 
Several aspects of crew performance were carefully reassessed - in 
particular the retention of process knowledge and fault-finding 
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ability. Four days were allocated to this re-training and this 
period was regarded as the absolute minimum. 
With regard to fault-finding performance after the five month 
pause, the results indicate that, after repeating the static test 
using the symptom patterns for the original fourteen faults 
presented in a random sequence and for thirty seconds each, the 
average score for the fourteen trainees was 10.2 out of 14 (or 
73*). 
Another retention test required trainees to give their opinions on 
the consequences of certain plant failures and the appropriate 
remedial actions to be taken. For example, "what would hapen if 
the turbine by-pass valve failed to open after a turbine trip? 
What would you do to remedy the situation?" The average score here 
was 13.4 out of a maximum of 17. 
The retraining included also dynamic testing with three or four of 
the original fourteen faults. Some time was used for explanations 
and discussions among crews about the nature of the failure and 
the alarm patterns which resulted. 
Results 
Overall, the training program accomplished its main objective 
which was the production of a number of crews sufficiently 
familiar with NORS to cope with a fairly complex set of 
experimental scenarios after only a very short training period. A 
point not to be overlooked is that the crews enjoyed the training 
and found the course useful. Questionnaire responses showed an 
increasingly favourable attitude on the part of the trainees as 
measured before and after the first training period. 
Unavoidable delays between the first training period and the 
experiment necessitated the running of a re-training course. Far 
from being a difficulty, however, this allowed us not only to 
refresh the trainees' knowledge of NORS immediately before the 
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experiment but also provided an ideal opportunity for measuring 
retention of the material learned and chus of assessing the 
efficacy of the training. 
Taken as a whole, the training material prepared so far serves as 
a good foundation for the further course development. Comments 
from trainees and suggestions for amendments to course content 
will also be taken into account. In addition, performance during 
experiments coupled with test results provides a good indication 
of strengths and weaknesses in trainees' knowledge. Awareness of 
this can be very useful in planning and pinpointing future 
training needs. 
Work is already underway on various improvements. A start has been 
made on the development of a training module dealing specifically 
with the diagnosis of plant failures and remedial actions 
appropriate under various disturbance conditions. The aim is not 
simply to provide training on a specific umber of pre-arranged 
transients, but to develop generalisable diagnostic skills which 
can assist the operator in dealing with plant disturbances he ha3 
not previously encountered. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Results were expected in the following areas: 
* better knowledge about operator tasks and operator performance 
in specific situations. 
* better methods for training 
* a reliable method for data acquisition and operator obser-
vation which can be used during regular training 
* better understanding of what constitutes effective operator 
strategies and knowledge as basis for good team performance. 
Regarding the control room operators* work situation 
Studies of several crews, each dealing with two incidents of 
varying complexity on a training simulator, indicated that 
deficiencies in (utilizing) process and system knowledge seem to 
be important sources of errors in disturbance handling - as are 
difficulties which crews experience in formulating a common 
strategic plan for coordinating their activities in order to cope 
with the situation. However limitations in the observation method 
employed did not permit the collection of data which could lead to 
actual information on the operators' thinking processes or 
motivations for action. I.e., the observation was limited to a 
considerable degree to the surface behavior of the crew on the 
plant as supplemented by the instructors' and observers' 
interpretations. Newer studies are attempting to overcome these 
limitations. 
At the theoretical level, the question of human reliability can be 
fruitfully handled through "parameters" which characterize the 
mastery of work - i.e., thinking, motivation and cooperation. The 
reliability of actions is dependent on the way they have been 
learned as well as the operators' means for reflecting upon their 
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own activity. For example, a conscious creation of activity 
structures should enhance the development of these means. 
Regarding diagnostic training 
It is obvious, both from written and from oral crew member 
comments, that some kind of supplementary operator support is 
highly desirable - especially in helping operators cope with 
disturbed system state situations for which no instructions are 
directly applicable. As no such operator support has been included 
in the crew members' previous training, the basic attitude of the 
participating experimental group members was very positive towards 
the diagnostic rule course. In principle, they considered the 
diagnostic rule methods to be a valuable and important support in 
disturbed system conditions. The practical circumstances of the 
diagnostic rule course did not, however, allow for more than five 
hours' diagnostic search training. This is, of course, completely 
inadequate when trying to lay down search methods based on 
heuristics, the nature of which are totally different from 
algorithmic methods. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the 
data collection did not show any substantial differences between 
the experimental and control groups. 
Therefore the main result of the study should be regarded as the 
positive attitudes shown by the crew members towards employing 
learned heuristic diagnostic rules. It is encouraging that 58 per 
cent of the crew members had the rules in mind, despite the short 
duration of the diagnostic search training. Equally encouraging is 
the fact that 95 per cent of these crew members found the diag-
nostic rules to be helpful during the transient treatments. This 
could be regarded as a hint of the potentials of a diagnostic rule 
course of longer- duration. 
#
 Testing of the Fault Symptom Matrix as a vehicle for 
establishing useful heuristic diagnostic rules proved to be a 
useful exercise although generalizations to other 
systems/contexts can be difficult since some of the rules turn 
out to be quite plant-specific. 
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* Studies during the NORS training program of the retention of 
learned material on fault symptoms after a five month pause 
gave encouraging results. The original training had consisted 
of both "static" tests using slides of symptom patterns as 
well as "dynamic" simulator testing. 
Performance observation 
The instructor's observation method based on the developed form 
could be used routinely in simulator training provided that 
appropriate and sufficient training of instructors has been given. 
Of course this could be altered in different ways to suit various 
practical circumstances, but the principle of using diagnostic 
phases should be kept intact. As these phases are based on the 
normal way of approaching disturbed system states, data concerning 
the phases will provide a logical and structured analysis of crew 
performance for the transient de-briefings. The content and 
presentation of the diagnostic rule course have shown that the 
nature and application of diagnostic rules can easily be 
understood by control room crew members. Unfortunately, the 
restricted course duration made a thorough practical application 
and evaluation impossible. 
As a consequence of the above-mentioned conclusions, future 
research should be carried out in the following areas of 
diagnostic search training: 
* Pedagogical and training strategy aspects of diagnostic search 
training. This includes the impact of different cognitive 
taxonomical levels on training methods and strategies etc. 
* Analyses of how algorithmic and heuristic based search rules 
can be combined, both in training and in practical 
applications. 
* Integration of diagnostic search methods in basic and follow-
up operator training schemes. 
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